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Equity, Punishment, and the Company You Keep:
Discerning a Disgorgement Remedy under the Federal Securities Laws
Theresa A. Gabaldon
I. Introduction
Since its inception in 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”
or the “SEC”) has wielded statutory authority to seek injunctive relief for violations of the
federal securities laws. 1 Since 1970 courts have, at the Commission’s behest and without much
analysis, ordered violators to disgorge profits – make that lots and lots of profits – gained in the
course of their wrongdoing. 2 In some instances, the profits are returned to victims. In others,
either because the victims are too many and too scattered or because the violation is a victimless
one such as engaging in bribery, the ill-gotten gains are kept by the government. In either case,
the existence of the disgorgement remedy has been regarded by the lower federal courts as well
settled enough so as to result in SEC disgorgement recoveries of over $2.9 billion in 2017 alone. 3
During the period that the Commission has successfully pursued disgorgement actions
Congress has extended its enforcement authority several times. 4 The SEC now is specifically
empowered to (among other things) seek to bar certain violators from serving in the financial
industry, seek all equitable remedies, and, subject to stated caps, seek civil monetary penalties
for violations of the laws it is charged with enforcing. Notably, it is typical for each legislative
expansion of SEC authority to iterate that there is no intent to limit the Commission’s power to
pursue other remedies, ritually reciting something like “The actions authorized by this section

1

See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35 and 54-84 and accompanying text.
3
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement, ANNUAL REPORT: A LOOK BACK AT FISCAL
YEAR 2017, 7 https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2017.pdf.
4
See infra notes 100-31 and accompanying text.
2
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may be brought in addition to any other actions that the Commission . . . [is] entitled to bring.” 5
Moreover, both legislative history and statutory wording have acknowledged the SEC’s use of
the disgorgement remedy and have specified how disgorged amounts are to be factored into other
calculations, such as certain recoveries by private plaintiffs. 6 There even is a statutory scheme
dealing with the distribution of disgorged amounts to wronged investors. 7
Missing from the legislative tablet, however, is any explicit creation of the disgorgement
remedy itself, much less any attempt to define its nature and parameters. It has fallen to the
federal courts (and academics) to struggle with niceties like whether the amount to be paid
pursuant to a disgorgement order can be discharged in bankruptcy, 8 whether a disgorgement
order constitutes “jeopardy” for purposes of the Seventh Amendment, 9 whether actions for
disgorgement give rise to the right of trial by jury, 10 and whether there is an applicable statute of
limitations.11 The last of these questions eventually resulted in a split among the Circuits and was
resolved (in the affirmative) by the Supreme Court in Kokesh v. SEC. 12
Although Congress has specified a statute of limitations for most of the remedies
available to private plaintiffs under the federal securities laws, 13 it has tended to rely on catch-all
provisions found elsewhere in the United States Code to provide limits for government
enforcement actions. Thus, 28 U.S.C. §2462, which traces lineage from the 18th century,
generally requires that “enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,” be “commenced

5

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21A(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. §78u (2018) (relating to civil penalties for insider trading).
See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
8
See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
9
See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
10
See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
11
See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
12
Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S.Ct. 1635 (2017).
13
See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §13, 15 U.S.C. §77m (2018) (specifying statute of limitations for express private
rights under that Act).
6
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within five years from the date when the claim first accrued.” 14 The federal courts easily
concluded that this statute restrains the SEC’s express statutory authority to seek civil monetary
penalties; in 2013, the Supreme Court confirmed its applicability regardless of the time the claim
was discovered. 15
Left open until 2017, however, was the question whether disgorgement was a “fine,
penalty, or forfeiture.” The Kokesh case, noted above, held that it was a penalty, and thus subject
to Section 2462. 16 Moreover, the case had one of those footnotes, suggesting that the threshold
matter of whether courts should be ordering disgorgement in Securities Exchange Commission
enforcement actions at all might be up for grabs. 17 The lower federal courts already are
grappling with the fall-out as defendants in actions for disgorgement brought by the SEC and
other agencies are making invocation of that issue de rigueur. 18
This article first provides background on the judicial development of the SEC
disgorgement remedy, up to and through Kokesh. It then examines the paralleling legislative
developments, touching on the fraught subject of legislative history. After describing this
necessary context, the article relies on it to illuminate a problem endemic to litigation about
federal remedies. This has to do with the promiscuous use of the word “equitable,” which
appears to have greatly complicated any attempt to make sense of disgorgement. The confusion
resulting from a sea of unexamined assumptions about “equity” that floats throughout the
14

28 U.S.C. §2462 (2010)
Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S.Ct. 1216 (2013).
16
Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1639.
17
Kokesh,137 S.Ct. at 1642, n. 3 reads as follows:
Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order
disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied disgorgement
principles in this context. The sole question presented in this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in
SEC enforcement actions, is subject to §2462’s limitations period.
18
See, e.g., SEC v. Sample, 2017 WL 5569873 at *2 (N.D. Tx. Nov. 20, 2017); SEC v. Jammin Java Corp., 2017
WL 4286180 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2017); CFTC v. Reisinger, 2017 WL 4164197 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19,
2017); FTC v. J. Williams Enterprises, LLC, 2017 WL 4776669 at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2017).
15
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relevant cases and commentary has obscured a central issue. This is the difference between
whether a remedy exists and whether, if it does, there are constitutional consequences. 19 In the
process of shedding light on this subject, this article also addresses more modest goals. It
answers three specific questions. The first is whether a right to seek disgorgement could be said
to exist as a function of the Commission’s express authority to seek equitable remedies. The
second is whether the SEC’s right to seek disgorgement could be said to exist “at law.” The
third, which assumes an affirmative answer to both of the first two, is which of the two
characterizations is more appropriate.
The article’s conclusions as to these specific questions are as follow. First, SEC
disgorgement should be recognized as an equitable remedy in most instances involving inside
trading or similar fiduciary breach. Second, even if SEC disgorgement is not an equitable
remedy, Congress has manifested sufficient recognition of the practice to render it authorized “at
law”: it is essentially an “Invisible Man” that can clearly be discerned against its statutory
surroundings. 20 Third, the characterization as legal or equitable is really only important in
determining whether the defendant has a right to jury trial. This is a question that will not be
practically important if the Commission seeks some additional remedy that clearly carries the
right, but in any event should be determined by Seventh Amendment precedents applied on a
case by case basis. 21

19

A companion article examines a second problem, equally endemic to securities enforcement litigation and
exacerbated by Kokesh. This has to do with the definition of “punishment,” “penal,” and other variants in light of the
extremely unfortunate tendency of courts to assume that context is irrelevant and that the precedents are mix-and match. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Why Fences Aren’t Punishment – and Why the Opinion in SEC v. Kokesh is a
Crime (“Gabaldon, Fences”) (manuscript on file with the author).
20
The “Invisible Man” referred to is the protagonist in the 1897 eponymous science fiction novel by H.G. Wells, not
the 1952 work by Ralph Ellison. See H.G. WELLS, THE INVISIBLE MAN (1897).
21
Thus, as Part IVC will make clear, where there is not some other right-to-jury-triggering remedy sought, the SEC
presumably would prefer characterization of the remedy as equitable and the defendant would prefer
characterization as legal. What may be more important, however, is whether disgorgement is regarded as punitive.
That gives defendants an advantage as far as the statute of limitation is concerned, but would have disadvantages for
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II. The History of SEC Disgorgement
A. Presaged by Injunctive Relief
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created by the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act” or “’34 Act”). 22 It was given the authority to make certain
examinations and issue certain orders in connection with the registration of securities under the
Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act” or “’33 Act”). 23 With respect to fraud and other
violations of the Securities Act, its enforcement authority was limited to referring matters to the
Justice Department for criminal prosecution 24 and, under Section 20(b), to “bring[ing] an action
in any district court of the United States, or United States court of any Territory, to enjoin such
acts or practices . . ..” 25 Its enforcement authority under Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act was
identically modest. 26
The Commission’s authority to bring actions was matched with a declaration of the
federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain them. 27 Section 22 of the Securities Act and Section 27
of the Exchange Act both provide that “[t]he district courts of the United States and United
States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this title
and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and . . .
such matters as deductibility and indemnification, by insurance or otherwise. These matters are addressed in Part
VC.
22
15 U.S.C. §78a et seq.
23
15 U.S.C. §77a et seq., 77h (Section 8).
24
Id. at 77t(2) (Section 20(b)).
25
Id.
26
15 U.S.C. §78a et seq., 78u (4). In its original numbering, the provision was §21(e). This article consistently
employs current numbering.
27
The securities laws’ statements of jurisdiction could be argued to be unnecessary, since they are in addition to the
more general grant of 28 U.S.C. §1331, which provides that "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Inclusion of the more specific
subject matter statements may have been a way to avoid the then-applicable amount in controversy limitation that
inhered in the more general grant. Alternately, they could represent an anticipatory response to the judicial tendency
to construe legislative grants of jurisdiction narrowly. See, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908) (legislatively conferred jurisdiction over federal questions does not extend simply to foreseeable
defenses); Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (narrowly construing legislative grant of diversity jurisdiction).

[DRAFT] | 105 Cornell L. Rev. __ (2020)

of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
title.” 28 Statements of jurisdiction are not necessarily regarded as giving rise to remedial power,
however, 29 so more to the point is the fact that the provisions referred to above empowering the
Commission to bring injunctive actions in federal district courts specifically directed that “upon
a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond.” 30 Since 1975, Section 21(e) of the ’34 Act also has provided that “[u]pon
application of the Commission the district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, injunctions, and orders commanding . . . any person to comply with
the provisions of this title, the rules, regulations, and orders thereunder . . ..” 31 Notwithstanding
the reference to “jurisdiction,” Section 21(e) is grouped with other matters referred to as
“authorit[ies]” and presumably should be understood in that sense, especially in light of the
breadth of the preexisting jurisdictional grant in Section 27 encompassing all “suits in equity and
actions at law.”
Between 1934 and 1970 the federal courts frequently did grant injunctive relief in actions
brought by the Commission. 32 The Commission also persuaded at least some courts to recognize
their own ability to order ancillary relief in the form of court-appointed receivers in cases where

28

15 U.S.C. §77a et seq., 77v(1); 15 U.S.C. §78a et seq., 78aa(1).
See George W. Dent, Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 866 MINN. L.
REV. 865, 892 at notes 121-22 (1983). For instance, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the
Court clearly held that “Section 27 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts and provides for venue and service of
process. It creates no cause of action of its own force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. The source of plaintiffs'
rights must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act . . ..” Id. at 577.
30
15 U.S.C. §77a et seq., 77v(1); 15 U.S.C. §78a et seq., 78aa(1).
31
15 U.S.C. §78a et seq., 78u(5). By contrast, the ’33 Act refers only to writs of mandamus to comply with the
provisions of the title and the Commission’s orders. 15 U.S.C. §77a et seq., 77t(3) (Section 20(c)). Federal writs of
mandamus have been abolished. See Dent, supra note 29, at 899, n. 150.
32
See Daniel V. Listwa & Charles Seidell, Penalties in Equity: Agency Use of Disgorgement After SEC v. Kokesh,
forthcoming in 35 YALE J. REG. 667, 673-75 (2018) (manuscript on file with the author); Edmund B. Frost, SEC
Enforcement of the Rule 10b-5 Duty to Disclose Material Information – Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case,
54 MICH. L. REV. 944, 962-66 (1967).
29
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corporate assets would be jeopardized if left unprotected. 33 In several cases, the Commission
also entered into voluntary consent arrangements pursuant to which defendants agreed to
disgorge their ill-gotten gains in exchange for some reciprocal concession by the SEC. 34 A series
of Supreme Court cases suggesting an expansive view of the federal courts’ ability to fashion
remedies not expressly delineated by statute, coupled with persuasive academic commentary, is
said to have encouraged the Commission to expand its use of disgorgement and to aggressively
seek it as an ancillary remedy in litigation. 35
B. The Concept of Ancillary Remedies
The most notable of the Supreme Court cases supporting the authority of the district
courts to grant disgorgement was Porter v. Warner Holding Co. 36 Exactly how the holding
survives some of the Court’s subsequent cases, discussed below, 37 is an open question, although
it was cited in Kokesh for the proposition that restitution to injured parties is different in kind
from penalties paid to the government. 38 In any event, its form of reasoning merits close
attention.
Porter dealt with a proceeding initiated by the Price Administrator under § 205(a) of the
Emergency Price Control Act. That section provided as follows:
Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has engaged or is about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of any
33

Esbitt v. Dutch-American Mercantile Corp., 335 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1964); SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397 (7th
Cir. 1963); Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
919 (1961);SEC v. H.S. Simmons & Co., 190 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. SEC v. Quing N. Wong, 252 F.
Supp. 608, 613 (D.P.R. 1968) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss portion of SEC’s complaint seeking an
accounting and restitution); SEC v. Bennett & Co., 207 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.J. 1962) (appointment of receiver denied
as not necessary under the circumstances).
34
See, e.g., Ward La France Truck Company, 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); SEC v. First Investment Co. of Concord, SEC
Litigation Release No. 281 (June 20, 1945).
35
See John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DUKE L.J. 641, 64447 (1977).
36
328 U.S. 395 (1946).
37
See infra notes 198-202 and 219-35 and accompanying text.
38
Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1644.
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provision of section 4 of this Act, he may make application to the appropriate court for an
order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such
provision, and upon a showing by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is
about to engage in any such acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond. 39
The question presented, necessitated by the principle that equity is only permissible where legal
remedies are inadequate, was whether the district court had the authority under this section to
order restitution of excess rents charged, notwithstanding the existence of § 205(e), which
permitted aggrieved individuals to bring legal actions for damages.
The Court noted that jurisdiction under § 205(a) indeed was equitable and that, “[u]nless
otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are
available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction.” 40 It went on to say that “. . .
since the public interest is involved in a proceeding of this nature, those equitable powers assume
an even broader and more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake.” 41
It would be hard to overstate just how broadly and flexibly the Porter Court saw the federal
equity power to be, but its rhapsody on the subject crescendoed with the observation that
. . . the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in
the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words,
or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. “The great principles of
equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction.” 42
In other words, the Court found itself quite in the mood to conclude that a decree compelling
restitution of amounts acquired in violation of the Emergency Price Control Act was proper.
Before doing so, however, the Court linked its conclusion to the language in § 205(a)
authorizing “a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order.” (Emphasis
39

50 U.S.C. §205(a).
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 398 (quoting Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503).
40
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added.) According to Porter, “the term ‘other order’ contemplates a remedy other than that of an
injunction or restraining order, a remedy entered in the exercise of the District Court's equitable
discretion.” 43 The Court gave two reasons for characterizing an order for the restitution of illegal
rents as a “proper ‘other order.’”
First, restitution could be considered an “equitable adjunct” to an injunction, for
“[n]othing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an injunction than the recovery
of that which has been illegally acquired and which has given rise to the necessity for injunctive
relief.” 44 Even though such a decree could not be independently sought at equity if an adequate
legal remedy existed, “where, as here, the equitable jurisdiction of the court has properly been
invoked for injunctive purposes, the court has the power to decide all relevant matters in dispute
and to award complete relief even though the decree includes that which might be conferred by a
court of law.” 45
Second, restitution could be considered “an order appropriate and necessary to enforce
compliance with the Act.” According to the Court, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that
future compliance would be more likely if miscreants are compelled to restore their illegal
gains; 46 moreover, “[w]hen the Administrator seeks restitution under § 205(a), . . . he asks the
court to act in the public interest by restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which
rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.” 47
It must be noted again – as the Court pointed out in Kokesh – that Porter involved
restitution to injured parties rather than disgorgement paid to the U.S. Treasury. (For purposes of
clarity, this article consistently will use “restitution” to refer to amounts paid or to be paid to
43

Id. at 399.
Id. at 399.
45
Id. at 399.
46
Id at 400.
47
Id. at 402.
44
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injured parties, calculated by reference to the amount of plaintiff loss rather than by reference to
the amount of defendant gain. “Disgorgement” will refer to amounts calculated by reference to
defendant gain, whether or not it is paid to injured parties. As elaborated below, the Restatement
of Restitution uses the single term “restitution” for both. 48 ) Still, Porter’s concern with assuring
future compliance would seem to apply equally in the case of disgorgement. On the other hand,
to the extent that the “equitable adjunct” or “ancillary remedy” theory goes to the ability to
declare “complete relief,” one might argue that disgorgement does not relieve anyone unless the
amounts recovered actually are directed to victims. In some cases the amounts disgorged in
actions by the Commission do go to relieve victims: in 2017, $1.07 billion was disbursed to
investors. 49 Nonetheless, some amounts wind up in the federal treasury and the Commission has
gone to some pains to point out that its purpose in seeking disgorgement is related to public, not
private, interests. 50 The distinction between “restitution” and “disgorgement” for purposes of the
“complete relief” argument therefore is somewhat blurred. This was not, however, a distinction
that was in any way front and center when, as described in the next section, a court first ordered
disgorgement at the SEC’s request.
C. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
The Second Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. is a casebook classic. It
gives instruction on a number of matters, including the liability of insiders for dealing with their
own companies and/or on public markets while at a material informational advantage and the
liability of tippers for passing on information relied upon by others in making trades. 51 Lost in

48

See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
50
See, e.g., Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1643 (quoting SEC’s concession in its brief).
51
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). Also addressed are the liability of issuers for misrepresentations at times they are not
buying or selling their own securities and the general standard for materiality.
49
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the shuffle – or deliberately left on the editorial cutting-room floor – is discussion of the district
court’s ability to order the defendants to surrender their profits as requested by the SEC. 52
As some readers will recall, Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. was engaged in mineral exploration
and had located bountiful reserves in Canada. While negotiating for mining rights the company
publicly denied the richness of the strikes. In the meantime, several well-informed insiders
accepted stock options granted by a less-well-informed board, purchased stock and calls on the
open market, and shared the non-public information with others who did likewise. 53 Liabilities
established at the trial level were appealed to the Second Circuit, which overruled in small part,
affirmed in large part, and remanded the matter to the Southern District of New York to
determine the appropriate remedy.
The district court noted the (then) burgeoning judicial willingness to imply new remedies,
including utilization of inherent equity power to grant relief ancillary to an injunction. 54 Relying
primarily on secondary sources and citing Porter only in a footnote, it declared that the ancillary
relief doctrine was “sufficiently well established to support the relief here sought by the SEC if
the congressional purpose is effectuated by so doing.” 55 Alternatively, it found that authority to
strip the defendants of their profits was conferred by Section 27 of the 1934 Act, which provides,
as noted above, for jurisdiction of “all suits in equity and actions at law” to enforce that Act. 56

52

312 F. Supp. 77, 91-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1972).
53
Id. at 83.
54
Id. at 91.
55
Id.
56
Id. The court also invoked J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, in which the Supreme Court, relying on Section 27 rather than
on the ancillary relief doctrine, implied a private right of action under Section 14 of the Exchange Act. Also cited
was Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957), in which the Supreme Court
held that the congressional grant of jurisdiction in Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
“‘authorize[d] federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining
agreements . . ..’”
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, specifically relying on Porter. 57 The Second Circuit
acknowledged that the amounts paid most likely would be given to Texas Gulf Sulphur, rather
than contemporaneous traders, and noted that this result aligned with state law establishing that
inside trading is an injury to the issuer. 58
The defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur included Darke, an insider who had bought
securities himself and also recommended to others that they do so. Some of Darke’s tippees
passed the recommendation along to still others who traded. 59 In discussing the amount of
Darke’s monetary liability, the court noted that the Second Circuit had specifically ruled that his
tipping was a violation of the Exchange Act. It therefore included in its order the profits gained
by Darke’s immediate tippees, but felt that was a “sufficient deterrent.” 60 The Commission’s
request for the profits of the remote tippees thus was rejected. Although there was little else said
about the matter in Texas Gulf Sulphur, it is worth noting that subsequent Supreme Court
jurisprudence on insider trading consistently characterizes a tip as analogous to a trade followed
by a gift of proceeds. 61 In this analysis, the tipper has personally benefited to the extent of the
gift. This reconciles nicely with limiting disgorgement orders to an immediate tippee’s profits –
Darke presumably did intend something like a gift to his immediate tippees, but well may have
been indifferent with respect to the fortunes of the subsequent generation of tip recipients.
The remedy for those insiders accepting stock options on the basis of their illicit
informational asymmetry was simple (and in fact dictated by the first opinion of the Second

57

Childers v. US, 442 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971).
Id., citing Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E. 2d 910, 912-13 (NY 1969). The Second Circuit also distinguished
Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970), which held that, in the circumstances, an SEC-sought suspension was
punitive rather than equitable.
59
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. at 83.
60
Id. at 95.
61
See infra note 337 and accompanying text.
58
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Circuit) – cancellation of the options that had not already been surrendered. 62 The measure of
payments required from each of the defendants found guilty of inside trading by reason of the
open market purchase of stock was the difference between the price at which the defendant
purchased it and its price on the date that the “news was widely disseminated by the news media
and was available to the investing public . . ..” 63 This amount was augmented by interest ordered
from the date of dissemination. Interestingly, although four defendants were ordered to
relinquish the amount of their profits (others had already voluntarily paid them over to the
company), only one of those actually was enjoined from further violation of the Exchange Act. 64
D. Subsequent Judicial Developments
Following the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, the Commission routinely began to seek similar
orders in other insider trading cases, and expanded its requests for what widely became known as
“disgorgement” into other contexts. 65 One logical expansion involved issuer violations of the
federal securities laws by way of affirmative misrepresentation at the time of a sale of shares. 66
These bore an obvious similarity to insider trading transgressions insofar as gains by wrongdoers
logically were linked to losses by trading partners, even though those partners might sometimes
be difficult to identify and were not necessarily the recipients of the amounts disgorged.
Eventually, however, it became clear that disgorgement would be sought in the case of virtually
any securities violation, including those that had no obvious victims. Thus, for instance, the

62

401 F.2d at 856, 857.
312 F. Supp. at 93.
64
312 F. Supp. at 99.
65
Jacqueline K. Chang, Kokesh v. SEC: The Demise of Disgorgement, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 309, 310-11 (2018)
(citing several congressional expansions of SEC disgorgement power); See Ellsworth, supra note 35, at 641-42 nn.
3-4 (1977) (citing line of case law indicating expansion of the disgorgement remedy).
66
See SEC v. Quan, 817 F.3d 583, 594-95 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding disgorgement was an available remedy for false
or misleading statements); S.E.C. v. Autocorp Equities, Inc., 292 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1330 (D. Utah 2003) (holding
disgorgement was an available remedy for material misrepresentations as to value and authenticity of certificate of
deposits).
63

[DRAFT] | 105 Cornell L. Rev. __ (2020)

Commission sought and obtained disgorgement orders in the case of violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act provisions prohibiting bribery of foreign officials. 67 Although the amount
of profit in those cases might be a bit difficult to determine, courts saw no reason to be
particularly persnickety, and permitted the SEC to establish an “approximation” of the
defendant’s profit, leaving it to the defendant to show that the amount should be reduced. 68
Some defendants did successfully convince courts to reduce, or “offset” the amount to be
disgorged by the expenses incurred in generating their ill-gotten gains; 69 some did not. 70
During the early period of the remedy’s development, the Commission consistently
sought disgorgement as an adjunct to a request for injunction. 71 Courts initially relied on the
“ancillary remedy” analysis, but came to simply refer to disgorgement as itself an “equitable”
67

See, e.g., SEC v. Fiat S.P.A. & CNH Global N.V., SEC Litigation Release No. 20,835 (Dec. 22, 2008) (Fiat
S.p.A. and CNH Global N.V. agreed to approximately $7.2 million in disgorgement as part of a total DPA
settlement of approximately $17.8 million); SEC v. Siemens AG, SEC Litigation Release No. 20,829 (Dec. 15,
2008) (Siemens AG agreed to approximately $350 million in disgorgement as part of a total U.S. settlement of
approximately $800 million); In re Faro Techs., Inc., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-13059 (June 5,
2008) (Faro Technologies, Inc., agreed to approximately $1.8 million in disgorgement as part of a total NPA
settlement of approximately $2.9 million). Note, however, the argument of the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 446 F.3d at 1306, that issuers employing wrongdoers experience reputational damage. Presumably, in the
foreign corrupt practices area, harm to competitors also is foreseeable.
68
See, e.g., SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011); SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004); SEC
v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
69
See SEC v. Video Without Boundaries, Inc., 2010 WL 5790684 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010); SEC v. Berlacher, 2010
WL 3566790 at 15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010); SEC v. Shah, 1993 WL 288285 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993); SEC v.
Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
70
See SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); SEC v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 2004
WL 315185 at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2004), cert. denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211
(11th Cir. 2004); SEC v. TLC Invs. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001); SEC v. Kenton Capital,
Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998); SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080 (D.N.J. 1996); SEC v. Great
Lakes Equities, 775 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Mich. 1991); SEC v. United Monetary Servs., Inc., 1990 WL 91812 at 9
(S.D. Fla. May 18, 1990); SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706 (6th
Cir. 1985); SEC v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984); SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270
(S.D.N.Y.1980); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974). There is an interesting
debate about whether allowable expenses should be limited to the marginal cost of the illegal revenue or whether
some portion of allocable business expenses might also be permitted as an offset. Compare SEC v. McCaskey, 2002
WL 850001 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding brokerage fees should be distinguished from general business expenses,
the latter which should not offset disgorgement) with SEC v. Video Without Boundaries, Inc., 2010 WL 5790684
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010); SEC v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 94-95 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
general business expenses as valid offsets to disgorgement).
71
Edmund B. Frost, Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule 10b-5 Duty to Disclose Material InformationRemedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. REV. 944, 946 (1967).
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remedy that they assumed they were free to employ. 72 Thus, somewhere along the way, the
Commission began to request disgorgement orders even in the complete absence of injunctive
relief. 73 The amounts recovered became quite significant. 74 As further detailed in Part III of this
article, 75 these developments were hardly state secrets. In fact, in 2008, the Supreme Court
characterized SEC disgorgement recoveries as a reason to eschew recognizing a private right of
action against peripheral participants in fraudulent schemes, noting that “[t]he [Commission’s]
enforcement power is not toothless. Since September 30, 2002, SEC enforcement actions have
collected over $10 billion in disgorgement and penalties, much of it for distribution to injured
investors.” 76
Also somewhere along the way, a few aspects of the SEC disgorgement remedy became
more palpable. First, defendants’ gains, rather than plaintiffs’ losses, definitely were its measure
(although the method of calculating those gains varied) and there was no requirement that any
portion be paid to victims as restitution. 77 Second, the lower federal courts’ resolute
characterization of the remedy as equitable in nature had several consequences. Among other
things, it was not “jeopardy” for double jeopardy purposes 78 and, because it was not an action “at
law,” it did not give rise to a right to trial by jury. 79 Similarly, it was not a debt for purposes of
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Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 294-96 (1960).
See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
74
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Interestingly, in cases involving breach of fiduciary duty, disgorgement
orders can themselves be characterized as injunctive, given that fiduciaries profiting from use of a beneficiary’s
property (including confidences) have an affirmative duty to account for it. See infra note 225.
75
See infra note 98-137 and accompanying text.
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Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 U.S. 148 (2008), citing SEC, 2007
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, p. 26, http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2007.shtml (as visited Jan. 2,
2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
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See, e.g., Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
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See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1983); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d
90, 94-96 (2d Cir. 1978).
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the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act, 80 at least arguably was discharged in bankruptcy, 81
at least arguably was tax deductible, 82 and clearly was enforceable by contempt sanctions. 83
Moreover, for most of its history it was not, according to most courts, subject to any statute of
limitations. 84
E. Kokesh v. SEC
1. Background 85
Charles Kokesh owned and controlled two registered investment advisors that were the
managing general partners of four limited partnerships (known as “business development
companies”) investing the funds of “tens of thousands” of small investors in start-up companies.
Between 1995 and 2006, Kokesh managed to misappropriate $34.9 million from the business
development companies. Some of the money went directly to support Kokesh and his private
stable of 50-plus polo ponies and some was directed to satisfy expenses of his controlled
investment advisors. The SEC brought a civil enforcement action in 2009, alleging violations of
the Securities Exchange Act, the Investment Advisors Act, and the Investment Company Act; the
jury found violations of all three.

80

SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802-03 (5th Cir. 1993).
81
Id. at 801. But see In re Telsey, 144 B.R. 563, 565 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding it was a “fine, penalty, or
forfeiture and thus not discharged).
82
See Peter J. Henning, Deducting the Costs of a Government Settlement, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 24, 2014,
1:17 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/deducting-the-costs-of-a-government-settlement/ (describing
the disgorgement of a CEO's insider trading gains as “an equitable remedy” and, therefore, tax deductible); see also
Robert W. Wood, Insurance Industry Settlements Revive Old Questions: When Is a Payment a Nondeductible
Penalty?, 103 J. TAX'N 47, 48 (2005) (“Restitution (or disgorgement of profits) is generally deductible as a business
expense.”).But see Office of Chief Counsel, IRS, Memorandum, Section 162(f) and Disgorgement to the SEC, No.
201619008, at 9 (Jan. 29, 2016) (applying section prohibiting deductions for “any fine or similar penalty paid to a
government for the violation of any law).
83
Huffman, 996 F.2d at at 803; SEC v. Goldfarb, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85628, at *10-17 (N.D. al. 2012). But see
SEC v. New Futures Trading Int’l Corp., 2012 U.S. Disxt. LEXIS 55557, at *5-6 (D.N.H. 2012).
84
See, e.g., Riordan v. SEC, 627 F.3d 1230, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2010); SEC v. Find, 991 F.2d 1486, 1492-93 (9th Cir.,
1993).
85
The factual background is based on the recitations in Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1641, and the 10th Circuit decision at
834 F.3d 1158, 1160-62 (2016).
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The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, at the request of the
SEC, ordered a civil monetary penalty of $2.4 million, based on Kokesh’s conduct beginning in
2004. It also ordered disgorgement of $34,927,329 (plus prejudgment interest), representing the
full amount misappropriated beginning in 1995. Both parties, as well as the court, recognized
that the civil monetary penalty was subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which, as noted above, requires
that “enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,” be “commenced within five years
from the date when the claim first accrued.” Kokesh urged Section 2462’s application to the
disgorgement order as well, but the court followed 10th Circuit precedent in concluding that
disgorgement is not a penalty subject to Section 2462 because it is not punitive; rather, it is
remedial, returning the wrong-doer to the pre-wrongdoing status quo. This reasoning also had
been found persuasive in earlier decisions of the D.C. and 1st Circuits as well as a plethora of
district courts; 86 the only notable exception was the 11th Circuit’s resolution of SEC v. Graham. 87
On appeal, the 10th Circuit confirmed its earlier reasoning as to why disgorgement is nonpunitive and also addressed Kokesh’s claim that disgorgement is a forfeiture governed by
Section 2462. It noted that in common parlance “forfeit” and “disgorge” may be used
interchangeably, and that there are similarities in modern dictionary definitions of the terms. 88 It
politely declined to follow the 11th Circuit, in Graham, in relying on those similarities to
conclude disgorgement is a forfeiture under Section 2462. 89 Instead, the 10th Circuit plunged into
a thicket of legal history and statutory interpretation, emerging with the conclusion that
“forfeiture” should be understood by reference to Congressional understanding at the time of
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See, e.g., Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2009); SEC v. Banner Fund Intern., 211 F.3d 602, 617
(D.C. Cir. 2000); SEC v. Williams, 884 F.Supp. 28, 30, 31 (D. Mass. 1995); SEC v. Lorin, 869 F.Supp. 1117, 1122
(S.D.N.Y., 1994).
87
SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2016) (reasoning disgorgement is a “forfeiture”).
88
SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1165 (10th Cir. 2016).
89
Id. at 1167.
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enactment of Section 2462’s precursor. 90 This understanding was that “forfeiture” means a
“proceeding brought by the government against property that either facilitated a crime or was
acquired as a result of criminal activity.” (Emphasis added.) 91 The guilt or innocence of the
property’s owner is not dispositive. By contrast, modern disgorgement is an action for money
brought against a wrong-doer and thus is not a “forfeiture.” 92 This distinction is often referred to
as the difference between proceeding in rem (against property) and proceeding in personam
(against person).
2. The Opinion of the Supreme Court
As the result of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kokesh, the amount of the ordered
disgorgement was trimmed dramatically, reaching only the ill-gotten gains obtained beginning in
2004. Justice Sotomayor’s unanimously-ascribed opinion was quite straightforward. After
acknowledging the purpose of the federal securities laws to “establish the highest ethical
standards in all facets of the securities industry” 93 and summarizing the evolution of the
commission’s enforcement authority to include the ability (by statute) to pursue injunctive relief,
the authority (judicially recognized) to seek disgorgement, and the ability (again by statute) to
obtain civil monetary penalties, she reviewed the facts and history of the case. 94
Five pages into the decision, Sotomayor (with citation) praised statutes of limitations as
“vital to the welfare of society,” quoted Section 2462, and announced the court’s conclusion that
SEC disgorgement constitutes a “penalty” for purposes of that section. 95 It is at that point that
footnote 3 appears. It explains that the court is not opining on whether the federal courts have, in
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Id. at 1166.
Id. at 1165, 1166.
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Id. at 1164-65.
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Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1640.
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Id. at 1640-41.
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Id. at 1641, 1642
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the first place, the authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings. Exactly
why that might be an issue is the subject of Part IV of this article. 96 The reasoning that followed
footnote 3 in support of the Court’s conclusion that SEC disgorgement is a penalty relied almost
exclusively on an invocation of soundbytes from the Court’s own precedents. To some readers,
this may pose an interesting contrast to the lower court opinions, which struggled mightily both
with legal history and with nuances of statutory interpretation. 97 In any event, the Court’s
analysis of that matter is not necessary to a discussion of whether the disgorgement remedy has
been congressionally countenanced.
III. Meanwhile, Back at the Ranch: Congressional Developments vis a vis SEC Enforcement
Authority
Part II of this article portrayed the development of the SEC disgorgement remedy
primarily as a function of judicial nurturing, now threatened by Kokesh. There is, however, more
to the story. As noted above, the progress of the remedy was hardly a state secret – its growth
was well known to Congress. This Part of the article will make the point that Congressional
enthusiasm for disgorgement has been manifested in several ways. It will, as an initial matter,
ignore the very nice issue of whether there is such a thing as legislative intent. 98 It will simply
pretend that there is and that two of the places one can look to discern it are (1) the statutes
themselves, and (2) the statute’s accompanying legislative records. Section IIIA examines
explicit statutory developments – what might be called “statutory history” 99 or the “statutory
record.” Section IIIB investigates the most relevant of the congressional records accompanying
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See infra notes 162-340 and accompanying text.
Those same readers also may be interested in the selectivity and persuasiveness of the precedents invoked – a
matter examined more thoroughly in a companion work. See Gabaldon, Fences, supra note 19.
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See the discussion infra notes 139-61 and accompanying text.
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See Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 1613, 1644 (2014).
97

[DRAFT] | 105 Cornell L. Rev. __ (2020)

those developments – what might be called “legislative history.” Section IIIC returns to the
question of which materials properly may be considered.
A. The Statutory Record
To recapitulate, cruising into the 1970s and toward the case of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the Commission’s only statutory enforcement authority was to seek injunctions against
conduct violating the federal securities laws. Not too many years after Texas Gulf Sulphur,
however, the Securities Reform Act of 1975 amended Section 21(e) of the Exchange Act to
stipulate that, upon application of the Commission, district courts had jurisdiction to issue not
only writs of mandamus (which previously were the only subject of the section), but also
injunctions and orders commanding compliance with the Act and rules, regulations and orders
thereunder. 100 According to one commentator “[t]he legislative history does not explain the
addition, but it was probably a technical change to reflect the abolition of the writ of mandamus
in federal practice.” 101 Still, courts clearly already had authority under Section 21(d) to order
injunctions, so if the change was to accomplish anything, it presumably would be the addition of
“orders.” As writs of mandamus were legal 102 and injunctions were equitable, the nature of
“orders” is simply unrevealed by its statutory companions. Recall, however, that Porter v.
Warner Holding Co. held a statutory reference to injunctions and “orders” justified noninjunctive orders, including a restitution decree. 103 It therefore seems clear that Section 21(d)
could be read as authorizing the Commission to apply for orders that are other than injunctive –
without, of course, indicating what those orders might be. This reading obviously would
100

15 U.S.C. §78u(5). Section 21(e) now also extends to injunctions and orders to comply with the rules of selfregulatory organizations, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and the like.
101
Dent, supra note 29, at n. 150.
102
See Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1000 (2015); John H.
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and GreatWest, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1353 (2003).
103
See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
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comport with the canon of statutory construction mandating that words in a statute should not be
regarded as mere surplusage. 104
In the 1980s, public attention was captured by inside trading and Congressional attention
was captured by the prospect of getting tough on it. Two statutory provisions relevant to the
status of disgorgement were the result. One of these is Exchange Act Section 20A. That section
created a private right of action for those trading contemporaneously with any person violating
the ’34 Act by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic
information. The amount to be recovered (which is to be shared by all those contemporaneous
trading) is limited to “the profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or transactions that are
the subject of the violation.” 105 The recovery “shall be diminished by the amounts, if any, that
such person may be required to disgorge, pursuant to a court order obtained at the instance of the
Commission, in a proceeding brought under [Section 21(d) of this title relating to the same
transaction or transactions.” 106 At the time, of course, Section 21(d) expressly permitted the
Commission only to seek injunctive relief and in no way mentioned the pursuit of disgorgement
and/or monetary penalties. It would seem obvious, then, that Congress was both keenly aware of
the Commission’s practice of seeking disgorgement and regarded it as a matter of authorized
injunctive relief, be it ancillary or otherwise. In any event, Section 20A went on to provide that it
would not limit any other express or implied private right of action, nor any action by the
Commission or the Attorney General. 107
Also part of the decade’s “getting tough on insider trading” campaign was the adoption of
Section 21A, which for the first time authorized the Commission to seek “civil penalties.” It was
104

ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 174 (2012).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §78t-1 (2018).
106
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §20A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78t-1 (2018)
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limited to the context of (1) those persons engaging in violations of the ’34 Act by trading while
in possession of material non-public information or by communicating such information, and (2)
those persons controlling primary violators. The amount of the penalty was to be determined by
the court, but was “not to exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided” as a result of the
violation. 108 “Profit gained or loss avoided” was defined as “the difference between the purchase
or sale price of the security and the value of that security as measured by the trading price of the
security a reasonable period after public dissemination of the nonpublic information.” 109 This
measure is, of course, not only logical but also the one approved by the court in Texas Gulf
Sulphur. 110 A five-year statute of limitations was stipulated, 111 as was the non-exclusivity of the
remedy: “The actions authorized by this section may be brought in addition to any other actions
that the Commission or the Attorney General are entitled to bring.” 112
In 1990, the SEC sought and obtained the ability to more generally seek civil monetary
penalties. The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act 113 (the “Remedies
Act”) thus added Exchange Act Section 21(d)(3), 114 specifying the Commission had authority to
bring actions for, and district courts had jurisdiction to order, civil penalties. These penalties
were to be capped by a sliding scale, in tiers by progressive culpability, or by “the gross amount
of pecuniary gain” as a result of the defendant’s violation, whichever was greater. 115 The
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78u-1 (2018).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21A(e), 15 U.S.C. §78u-1 (2018).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21A(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. §78u-1 (2018).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21A(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. §78u-1 (2018).
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Commission promptly commenced the practice of seeking both disgorgement and civil penalties
from the same defendants. 116
The 1990 Remedies Act also expanded the Commission’s authority to order certain
remedies administratively. These included cease and desist orders 117 and, with respect to
violations by regulated securities professionals, civil monetary penalties capped by a sliding
scale without reference to pecuniary gain. 118 In addition, in any case in which a cease and desist
order was issued or a civil monetary penalty was imposed, the Commission was specifically
empowered to order accounting and disgorgement. 119 One commentator has argued that
statutory recognition of the administrative disgorgement remedy conclusively establishes that the
judicial remedy does not exist.120 As another has stated (and as legislative history clearly shows),
it simply was obvious that Congress believed that the Commission already was able to seek
judicially ordered disgorgement as a matter of equity and sought to offer a parallel opportunity to
act administratively. 121
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See, e.g., SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 865-67 (2d Cir. 1998); SEC v. Moran, 944 F.Supp. 286, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F.Supp. 2d 505, 528-30 (D. N.J. 1999).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21C, 15 U.S.C. §78u-3 (2018).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§21B(a) - (b), 15 U.S.C. §78u-2 (2018).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§21B(e), 15 U.S.C. §78u-2 (2018).
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Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE at *11 (2013).
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Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 321
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to be the case. Ryan, supra note 120, at n.12. Some of the reasons that could be ascribed include the fact that
administrative disgorgement originally required coupling with a civil monetary penalty or cease and desist order.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Moreover, although the SEC might order disgorgement, it has no way to
enforce the order without repair to a court for an injunction. Dixie L. Johnson et al., King & Spalding Discusses
Potential Effects of SEC Disgorgement As a Penalty, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 21, 2017) [hereinafter King
& Spalding], http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/06/21/king-spalding-discusses-potential-effects-of-secdisgorgement-as-penalty/ (discussing the lack of express statutory authority regarding the SEC's authority to pursue
disgorgement in federal court). In addition, contempt orders are reserved for violations of orders of courts, not those
of administrative agencies, and only court orders have the collateral estoppel effect that might benefit private
plaintiffs. Catherine E. Maxson, The Applicability of Section 2462’s Statute of Limitations to SEC Enforcement Suits
in Light of the Remedies Act of 1990, 94 MICH. L. REV. 512, 522-23 (1995). In recent years, however, a distinct
uptick in use of the administrative enforcement route has been accompanied by a dramatic uptick in complaints
about it (see generally David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155 (2016) (discussing
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In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the concept of Commissionsought and/or ordered disgorgement was further recognized in new Exchange Act Section
21(d)(4), which reads as follows:
Prohibition of attorneys' fees paid from commission disgorgement funds. Except as
otherwise ordered by the court upon motion by the Commission, or, in the case of an
administrative action, as otherwise ordered by the Commission, funds disgorged as the
result of an action brought by the Commission in Federal court, or as a result of any
Commission administrative action, shall not be distributed as payment for attorneys' fees
or expenses incurred by private parties seeking distribution of the disgorged funds. 122
Congress thus specifically recognized both the express authority of the SEC to obtain
disgorgement in its own administrative proceedings and its ability to seek court-ordered
disgorgement.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) 123 provided additional indicators of
Congressional understanding of the existence of SEC disgorgement practices. Section 308(a) of
Sarbanes-Oxley (which is not part of the Exchange Act) bore the heading “Civil Penalties Added
to Disgorgement Funds for the Relief of Victims.” It provided as follows:
If in any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities
laws (as such term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)) the Commission obtains an order requiring disgorgement against
any person for a violation of such laws or the rules or regulations thereunder, or such
person agrees in settlement of any such action to such disgorgement, and the Commission
also obtains pursuant to such laws a civil penalty against such person, the amount of such
civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the direction of the Commission, be added to and
become part of the disgorgement fund for the benefit of the victims of such violation. 124

various criticisms)), up to and including the contention (now confirmed by the Supreme Court) that the traditional
method of appointing administrative law judges was unconstitutional. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S.Ct. 2044, 2060 (2018).
122
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 757 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
123
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). Sarbanes-Oxley was an enormously popular piece of legislation, passing 423-3 in the
House and 99-0 in the Senate. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/107-2002/s192.
124
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, §308(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). Section 308(a) was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 to eliminate the
requirement that civil penalties be paid to victims only if disgorgement also was ordered. It now reads as follows:
(a) CIVIL PENALTIES TO BE USED FOR THE RELIEF OF VICTIMS.—
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This is an obvious indication that Congress understood the Commission to have the authority to
obtain disgorgement both administratively and by judicial order. It also makes the clear point
that Congress regarded disgorgement as something other than a civil penalty. This point
similarly was made by Section 308(c), which ordered the Commission to study and report on its
previous five years of “proceedings to obtain civil penalties or disgorgements to identify areas
where such proceedings may be utilized to . . . provide restitution for injured investors . . ..” 125
More generally, Sarbanes-Oxley added new Exchange Act Section 21(d)(5), which
permits the Commission to seek, and any federal court to grant, “any equitable relief that may be
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.” 126 One might (disingenuously) argue that
the grant should be taken to reflect recognition that such authority did not previously exist. More
plausibly, it might be taken to reflect a desire to make explicit something already regarded as
implicit. Alternately, it may just reflect the same kind of Congressional chest-pounding that, in
post-Enron roiling financial waters, led our courageous legislators also to include in SarbanesOxley a provision specifying that securities fraud is illegal (as if there were not already several
very well-known provisions to that effect). In any event, it is clear that if disgorgement indeed
were an equitable remedy it now would be expressly authorized. Whether it is such a remedy is
the subject of Part IVB(1) of this article. 127

If, in any judicial or administrative action brought by the Commission under the securities laws, the
Commission obtains a civil penalty against any person for a violation of such laws, or such person agrees,
in settlement of any such action, to such civil penalty, the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion
or at the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of a disgorgement fund or other fund
established for the benefit of the victims of such violation.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, sec. 929B, §308(a), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
125
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §308(c), 18 U.S.C. §7246.
126
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §807, 18 U.S.C. §1348.
127
See infra notes 183-271 and accompanying text.
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Most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) added new Exchange Act
Section 21F. 128 That section created a scheme for the (pardon the expression) “incentivization”
and protection of whistleblowers. As part of that scheme, whistleblowers meeting certain
requirements may be awarded bounties for providing information leading to “monetary
sanctions” in excess of $1,000,000. 129 “Monetary sanctions” means, “when used with respect to
any judicial or administrative action,” “(A) any monies, including penalties, disgorgement, and
interest, ordered to be paid; and (B) any monies deposited into a disgorgement fund . . ..” 130 This
also suggests that Congress understood the Commission to have the authority to obtain
disgorgement both administratively and by judicial order, and regarded disgorgement as
something other than a penalty. 131 One might argue that calling disgorgement a “monetary
sanction” is just another way of saying it is a penalty, but given that interest also is a “monetary
sanction,” it seems fair to conclude that “monetary sanction” is simply a defined term that is
being used for purposes of convenience and might as well have been “dingus” or “frindle.”
Raising these counterarguments, however, creates an occasion to point out that Congress, courts
and commentators (including the author of this article) tend not to use such terms as “sanction”
and “remedy” very carefully; as often as not they simply are attempting a short-hand for “the
unpleasant legal consequence of taking an act.” Consider, for example, the use of “remedies” in
the title of the 1990 Remedies Act to include a broad array of such consequences, some of which
might be regarded as remedial and some of which are clearly punitive.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21F, 15 U.S.C. §78u-6 (2018).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21F(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §78u-6 (2018).
130
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21F(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §78u-6 (2018).
131
Notably, in another part of Dodd-Frank, Congress authorized the Commodities Futures Trading Commission to
seek, and federal courts to grant, any equitable remedy, specifically including restitution and disgorgement. 7
U.S.C.A. §13a-1(d)(3). Yet another section similarly empowered the newly created Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §1055, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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B. Legislative History and Legislative Intent

Warning: Contains explicit legislative history. Those sensitive should
avert their eyes.
This section continues the assumption that legislative intent is a legitimate concern in
determining statutory meaning. It turns from the explicit statutory breadcrumbs that lead to the
common sense conclusion that Congress has approved the SEC’s pursuit of disgorgement in the
federal courts and examines legislative history writ more expansively.
In 1972, the Commission’s Annual Reports to Congress began to disclose both that it
regarded disgorgement as a part of its arsenal and that the purpose of disgorgement was
deterrence rather than compensation for particular victims:
The SEC's primary function is to protect the public from fraudulent and other unlawful
practices and not to obtain damages for injured individuals. Thus, a request that
disgorgement be required is predicated on the need to deprive defendants of profits
derived by their unlawful conduct and to protect the public by deterring such conduct by
others. 132
The Commission subsequently has, on an annual basis, reported to Congress the amounts
obtained through disgorgement, as well as the amounts obtained as civil penalties following their
authorization, in 1990, by the Remedies Act. 133
The legislative history for the Remedies Act is particularly instructive with respect to
Congressional awareness of the SEC disgorgement remedy. According to the House Report on
that Act, “authority to seek or impose substantial money penalties, in addition to disgorgement of
profits, is necessary for the deterrence of securities law violations.” (Emphasis added.) 134 The
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38 SEC ANN. REP. 70 (1972).
These reports may be found at https://www.sec.gov/reports?aId=edittid&year=All&field_article_sub_type_secart_value=Reports+and+Publications-AnnualReports&tid=39. Moreover,
it responded to its Sarbanes-Oxley mandate to study and report to Congressional on its prior proceedings to obtain
civil penalties or disgorgements with an extremely detailed report on disgorgement practices.
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf.
134
H.R. Rep. No. 101-616, 1384 (1990).
133
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Senate Report went into a fairly vast amount of additional detail. 135 It makes for telling, if
lengthy, reading:
S. 647 represents another step in a process of strengthening the SEC's enforcement
authority that began with passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984
(ITSA). That legislation, for the first time, gave the SEC the authority to seek civil money
penalties for insider trading. Prior to passage of ITSA, the principal remedy available to
the SEC was an injunction against further securities law violations and disgorgement of
unlawful profits. Although an injunction subjects a defendant to possible criminal
contempt proceedings if he violates the same law again, some critics have argued that an
injunction serves only as a “slap on the wrist.” It also has been argued that disgorgement
of ill-gotten gains is an insufficient deterrent, because it merely restores a defendant to
his original position, without extracting a cost for his illegal behavior. In a sense, prior to
the enactment of ITSA, there was [no] financial “risk” to a person engaging in insider
trading. If caught, the insider trader only had to surrender his ill-gotten gains. . . .
(Emphasis added.) 136
The authors of the report thus manifested their understanding that disgorgement was a remedy
available to the SEC, both before and after the passage of ITSA. They also appear to endorse the
views of the “critics” to whom they refer, indicating that disgorgement is an insufficient
deterrent because it imposes no cost on the defendant.
The following passage also is telling:
In a number of enforcement cases, the SEC successfully has urged courts to invoke their
equitable powers to require that law violators “disgorge” the amounts by which they are
unjustly enriched. A recent judicial decision clarified that the SEC may obtain this relief
when there are violations of disclosure and filing requirements under the Federal
securities laws. Nonetheless, disgorgement requires only that the law violator give up his
unlawful gains and exacts no cost for his actions. 137
The drafters thus exhibit recognition of the variety of contexts, including filing violations, in
which courts already had been willing to order disgorgement.
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S. REP. 101-337, S. Rep. No. 337, 101ST Cong., 2ND Sess. 1990, 1990 WL 263550 (Leg.Hist.) P.L. 101-429, THE
SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES ACT OF 1990.
136
Id. at 6-7.
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Id. at 9-10.
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Other legislative history recognizing the existence of the SEC disgorgement remedy can
be found, and has been particularly well mustered by Professor Donna Nagy. 138 There is really
no need to present it here. If one accepts legislative history as indicative of legislative intent, and
if one cares about legislative intent in the first place, that intent with respect to SEC
disgorgement is crystal clear from what already has been presented. Those “ifs” are the subject
of the next section.
C. The Legitimacy of Inquiry into Legislative Intent
A boundless sea of law review pages has seen wave after battering wave of commentary
on the interesting and intricate question of whether there is such a thing as legislative intent. 139
As a theoretical matter, it seems inescapably to be true that the subjective intent of multiple
lawmakers is undiscoverable, and that the chances are high that as to any particular statute their
intentions are either different or nonexistent. As Professor Max Radin stated in 1930, “a
legislature has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men
drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving
majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.” 140 These
arguments resonate even for legislation as popularly endorsed as the Remedies and SarbanesOxley Acts (the former was approved by voice vote and the latter by votes of 423-3 in the House
and 99-0 in the Senate). 141 They have been extended by more modern “public choice” or “social
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See Donna Nagy in The Statutory Authority for Court-Ordered Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions, 71
SMU L. REV. 895, 903 (2018). Professor Nagy’s multiple sources include a colloquy between the Chair of the SEC
and Senator Riegle on why it was not necessary for the Remedies Act to specify in the statutes that the new civil
monetary penalty did not displace disgorgement.
139
See, e.g. See, e.g. Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 1021 (2017)
(arguing the fictional nature of legislative intent leaves interpreters of legislation with little reason to care about the
fine details about the legislative process); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Law: the Central Role of
Legislative Intent In Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 458 (2005) (using developments in linguistics, social
and developmental psychology, and philosophy to defend the use of legislative intent in statutory interpretation).
140
Max J. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
141
See supra notes 113 and 123 and accompanying text.
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choice” theorists who contended that legislators act, not for shared public purposes, but in
individual response to the influences of “rent seeking” special interests. 142
Legal process theory nonetheless eventually “shifted the terrain [from legislative intent]
to [legislative] ‘purpose’ because of realist critiques of ‘intent.’” 143 It is said that current
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer is a primary proponent of “purposivism,” 144 and that
“[p]urposivists have purportedly never seen legislative history that they did not like.” 145 Without
taking the time to work through the entire taxonomy, the types of legislative history that have
been considered by courts over time and that seem to be acceptable to purposivists include
statutory texts themselves, 146 statutory schemes, 147 the “equity of the statute,” 148 and evidence
generated in the formal deliberative process, such as committee reports and executive
messages. 149 In addition, courts sometimes have regarded as relevant to their inquiry the various
historical and legal developments of which Congress fairly should be aware. 150 Rather clearly,
purposivists would consider the matters discussed in Sections IIIA and IIIB of this article to be
quite relevant in resolving the question of the existence of the SEC disgorgement remedy.
Since at least the 1980s, however, “textualism” has existed as a counterpoint to both
intentionalism and purposivism. Textualists “typically refuse to treat legislative history as
142

See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (2d ed. 1963); William Eskridge,
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Social Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275,
277 (1988); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE, 423-24 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 223 (1986). For a specific invocation of public choice theory in the federal securities law context, see David
D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model With an Application to Insider
Trading Regulation, 20 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987).
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Nourse, supra note 99, at 1617.
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Id. at 1645.
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Id. at 1645.
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See generally 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ch. 48 (Sands, 4th ed. 1985).
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See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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‘authoritative’ evidence of legislative intent,” and “choose the letter of the statutory text over its
spirit.” 151 The goal of the textualist judge in applying statutes thus is limited to deriving
“meaning . . . from the ring the words would have had to a skilled user of words at the time,
thinking about the same problem.” 152 Former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was one of
the best known textualists; 153 as documented below, at least three current members of the Court
share and perhaps exaggerate his predilection. Presumably textualists would be rendered
nauseous by the legislative history presented in Section IIIB, but the statutory scheme outlined in
Section IIIA might be less unsettling. This article will argue (in fact, it seems to be doing so
already) that even textualists properly could conclude that the composite of federal securities
statutes discussed in Section IIIA adequately confirms the existence of an SEC disgorgement
remedy. Before amplifying that argument, it is worth a moment to consider Supreme Court
views on legislative history as of 2017-2018, as manifest in two opinions bearing on the federal
securities laws.
The first, Kokesh v. SEC, mustered a unanimous opinion. 154 In that decision, described
earlier in this article, Justice Sotomayor took a statute – the Section 2462 statute of limitations –
and sought the meaning of the single term “penalty” exclusively among the Court’s own
precedents. She did invoke, in passing, the purpose of the federal securities laws, but once again
relied solely on the Court’s own precedents to establish just what that purpose was. She
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John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005).
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 61
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otherwise found no occasion whatsoever to discuss the concepts of legislative history or
legislative intent. This may be one reason why the opinion was so cleanly unanimous.
By contrast, Digital Realty v. Somers, 155 unanimously decided a few months after
Kokesh, featured a majority opinion in which three Justices declined to join, notwithstanding
concurrence in the result, and spawned two concurring ripostes on Justice Ginsburg’s use of a
Dodd-Frank Senate Report in support of the majority’s conclusion. The issue in the case
involved the meaning of “whistleblower,” as used and defined in the Exchange Act. Justices
Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan evidently were undisturbed by invocation of
the report in question, which was relied upon as an expression of the statute’s purpose. 156
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch, however, did a runner, 157 prompting a back-and-forth with
Justices Sotomayor and Breyer, who filed their own concurrence. That concurrence joined the
majority opinion and specifically extolled the praise of legislative history. 158 The exchange is
well worth following.
First, consider the following statement by Justice Thomas (some citations and crossreferences omitted), in which Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined:
I join the Court's opinion only to the extent it relies on the text of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). . . . As the Court observes,
this statutory definition “resolves the question before us.” The Court goes on, however, to
discuss the supposed “purpose” of the statute, which it primarily derives from a single
Senate Report. Even assuming a majority of Congress read the Senate Report, agreed
with it, and voted for Dodd-Frank with the same intent, “we are a government of laws,
not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.”
And “it would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to
state in committee reports . . . that which is obvious on the face of a statute.” For these
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Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S.Ct. 767 (2018).
Id. at 782, 783.
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Id. at 783, 784
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reasons, I am unable to join the portions of the Court's opinion that venture beyond the
statutory text. 159
This compares with the following comments by Justice Sotomayor, in which Justice Breyer
joined (some citations and cross-references omitted):
Committee reports, like the Senate Report the Court discusses here, are a particularly
reliable source to which we can look to ensure our fidelity to Congress’ intended
meaning. “In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative
source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which
‘represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved
in drafting and studying proposed legislation.’” . . . It is . . . no surprise that legislative
staffers view committee and conference reports as the most reliable type of legislative
history. . . . Moreover, confirming our construction of a statute by considering reliable
legislative history shows respect for and promotes comity with a coequal branch of
Government. . . . For these reasons, I do not think it wise for judges to close their eyes to
reliable legislative history — and the realities of how Members of Congress create and
enact laws — when it is available. 160
Justice Sotomayor annotated her concurrence with evidence that members of Congress
themselves give import to legislative history. 161
Having accomplished its mission of establishing that there are theoretical divides on the
acceptable use of legislative history, as well as a continuing divide on the present day Supreme
Court, this article will not purport to divine any novel insights into the matter. Instead, in the
next Part it will turn to the topic of the various theories on which the existence of an SEC
disgorgement remedy might be recognized.
IV. Footnote 3 and the Sticky Wicket of Power: Does the SEC Possess the Authority to Pursue,
and the Courts the Power to Grant, the Remedy of Disgorgement?
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Digital Realty, 138 S.Ct. at 784 (quoting Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, ___ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) and Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980)).
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Digital Realty, 138 S.Ct. at 782, 783 (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (in turn quoting
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))).
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the United States before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 65-66 (1986) (Sen. Charles E.
Grassley) (“[A]s one who has served in Congress for 12 years, legislative history is very important to those of us
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Kokesh v. SEC reserved, in footnote 3, the questions “whether courts possess authority to
order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings” and “whether courts have properly applied
disgorgement principles in this context.” 162 The latter presumably goes to such matters as
whether offsets for expenses should be allowed and whether tippers may be ordered to disgorge
the profits obtained by their tippees. These are significant issues, but of course not as important
as the first stated question. That question, which was phrased by Justice Sotomayor not as
whether the SEC has the power to seek the remedy of disgorgement but as whether the courts
have the authority to order it, is the subject of this Part. It is organized as follows. Section IVA
suggests an easy way to resolve that the disgorgement remedy indeed exists. Section IVB
assumes that, for whatever reason, the federal courts might decline to adopt the IVA approach,
and significantly complicates matters. Section IVB(1) asks whether disgorgement fairly exists as
an equitable remedy. Section IVB(2) follows to ask whether it exists as a legal remedy. Section
IVC discusses the significance of the characterization as one or another. Section IVD
recapitulates.
A. The Easy Way: Legislative Reenactment and the “Beyond Peradventure” Approach
In 1971, the Supreme Court first expressly addressed the existence of an implied private
right of action under Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Its approach was simple. The
opinion in Superintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. merely cited
Professor Louis Loss’s well-known treatise on securities regulation for the proposition that “[i]t
is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10 (b).” 163 A few years later,
in 1983, the Court in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston noted that “a private right of action
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35
162
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years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.” 164 A footnote in
Herman & MacLean recounted the history of the remedy, first recognized in 1946 and clearly
flourishing in the federal courts both before and after the statement in the Superintendent of
Insurance case referred to above. 165
It would seem that this eminently sensible approach would work just as well in the
context of the SEC disgorgement remedy, which has both been churning along in the federal
courts for forty-eight years and making regular appearances in federal statutes since 1988. 166
Shouldn’t it be easy peasy for the federal courts to simply acknowledge the common sense of the
matter – the remedy exists and Congress clearly so desires? But no, that does seem too easy,
given the ominous footnote 3 in Kokesh, the textualist predisposition of some Justices, and the
fact that although the implied private right under Rule 10b-5 exists “beyond peradventure” the
Supreme Court has worked hard in recent years to prevent its expansion. 167 It behooves
proponents of the “beyond peradventure” approach to themselves work a little bit harder, first by
beefing up the argument with a formal invocation of the legislative reenactment theory.
The legislative reenactment theory is a principle of statutory construction, the primary
thrust of which is that when a reenacted statute fails to change the prevailing administrative or
judicial interpretation of some earlier version of that statute, the interpretation is legislatively
endorsed. 168 Congress is presumed generally to be aware of such interpretations, 169 and
164
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reenactment of a statute after favorable discussion in committee hearings of a relevant
interpretation logically conveys particularly strong indicia of approval. 170 There in fact was a
time at which courts regarded legislative endorsement as more-or-less conclusive when repeated
reenactments followed notorious interpretations. 171
Of course, there also was a time at which people unflinchingly used words like “groovy,”
and that time is pretty well past. In 1994, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 172 the majority of the Court acknowledged that “[w]hen Congress reenacts
statutory language that has been given a consistent judicial construction, we often adhere to that
construction in interpreting the reenacted statutory language.” 173 It then went on, however, to
express the understanding that for legislative reenactment even to be considered, Congress must
have reenacted the precise language a federal court seeks to interpret. 174 Absent that, the matter
is not one of legislative reenactment, but one of possible legislative acquiescence. 175
Legislative acquiescence is a weaker sibling of the legislative reenactment theory. Its
thrust is that legislative inaction following a well-known course of statutory interpretation is
regarded as some evidence that the legislature acquiesces in that interpretation. For instance, in
the 1988 case of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court noted that ‘[j]udicial interpretation
and application, legislative acquiescence and the passage of time have removed any doubt that a
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private cause of action exists for a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5.” 176 In Central
Bank, however, the Court’s majority enthusiastically quoted an interim case for the proposition
that
It does not follow . . . that Congress’ failure to overturn a statutory precedent is reason for
this Court to adhere to it. It is “impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that
congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional approval of the [courts’]
statutory interpretation. . . . Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the passage
of a bill which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President. . . .
Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.” 177
Although some members of the Court – notably including Justices Ginsburg and Breyer –
sometimes may still rely on legislative acquiescence arguments, 178 it is clear that others do not.
It does seem as though overt legislative action with respect to disgorgement goes beyond
mere acquiescence and on to something like very active connivance, so perhaps a convincing
argument straddling reenactment and acquiescence can be made. If so, it would not necessarily
establish whether disgorgement is a legal or equitable remedy. Moreover, it seems possible that
any Justice truly wedded to textualism might, if push came to shove, balk at endorsing even the
reenactment theory if it were outcome determinative (in Central Bank it was not). 179 As argued
below, however, such a Justice just possibly might be willing to regard an adoption of a new
statute as re-rooting in modern times the commonly held understanding of the statute’s words.
That is part of a more complicated argument – one to which the article now turns.
B. The Hard Way
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The introduction to this Part noted that Justice Sotomayor portrayed te possible nonexistence of the SEC disgorgement remedy as an issue of judicial competenece. This
observation is a wormhole into the universe of meanings for the word “equity” or its variant
“equitable.” As the reader proceeds it should be with one clear guideline: when Congress
authorizes an agency to seek, and the courts to grant, equitable relief, the definition of
“equitable” is a question of statutory meaning for purposes of the particular statute under
consideration. The distinction between legal and equitable claims also is important for purposes
of determining when a defendant has a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury (legal claim,
yes, equitable claim, no). This, however, is a matter of constitutional law, not an issue of a
particular statute’s meaning. For that purpose it is possible generally to observe that a claim is
legal “if the underlying right derive[s] from a legal source – for example, the common law or a
statute providing a legal right or obligation.” 180 If it is based on historic equity practices, it is
equitable. 181 Section IVB1 discusses the possibility that SEC disgorgement is an equitable
remedy. Section IVB2 advances the suggestion that it could be regarded as a legal remedy
notwithstanding the past tendency to characterize it as equitable. Section IVC investigates the
consequences of classifying it one way or another.
1. Equity and Disgorgement
Let us first consider the proposition that disgorgement is an equitable remedy. In the
words of Mr. Russell Ryan, a former Assistant Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement,
[E]ver since disgorgement was first accepted as a lawful remedy in SEC enforcement, the
only plausible sources of authority cited to support it are either the courts’ inherent power
to grant equitable remedies ancillary to their explicit statutory power to grant injunctive
relief or the recent statutory provision for “equitable relief” added by Sarbanes-Oxley. If
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Kristin A. Collins, “A Consderable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the
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and when disgorgement is not in fact an equitable remedy, neither source of lawful
authority is available. 182
Mr. Ryan is entirely correct that the equitable ancillary remedy theory initially was regarded as
the source of authority for judicial orders of SEC disgorgement. 183 His observation also
accurately reflects the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 authorized the SEC to seek, and
the federal courts to grant, “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the
benefit of investors.” 184 His conclusion that neither source of authority is available if
disgorgement is not an equitable remedy thus is facially logical. 185 The remainder of Mr. Ryan’s
article is devoted to establishing that disgorgement indeed is not equitable in nature. 186 This
article, by contrast, takes the positon that whether disgorgement is equitable depends on the
nature of the alleged violation, and that even when it is not an equitable remedy it still exists as a
legal remedy.
a. 1789 and All That
Upon reading the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Kokesh that disgorgement is deterrent
and therefore punitive, rather than remedial, one might jerk one’s knee toward “Oh, then of
course disgorgement is not equitable – punishment has never been a legitimate goal of equity,
right?” 187 Not right, even though the Supreme Court itself has at times bought into that
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186
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See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future of the Disgorgement Penalty in
SEC Cases, 56 WASH. U.J.L. & POL. 18, 26 (2018) (observing that equity cannot punish); Samuel L. Bray, Equity at
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particular canard. 188 In fact, according to noted British jurist Lord Henry Homes Kames, writing
in the 18th century, the historic courts of equity were totally cool with it. Well, perhaps he put it
a bit differently, but he did devote an entire chapter of his treatise, Principles of Equity, to the
“Power of a court of equity to inflict punishment, and to mitigate it.” 189 The basis for the
argument against the federal courts’ ability to order disgorgement as a matter of equity is
substantially more complicated, if a little weird to novices to the study of federal courts.
As it turns out, there are planets on which the inhabitants continue to care – deeply –
about exactly what English Chancery was getting up to in 1789, taking the position that it limits
the remedies that the SEC can seek and the federal courts can grant in the 21st century. The
outlines of the larger argument about the ability of the federal courts to do equity, about which a
number of articles have been written, 190 are as follow.
When the Judiciary Act organized the federal courts in 1789, it imbued them with the
ability to exercise both legal and equitable authority. 191 Rather than being thought simply to
convey that federal courts can do whatever the heck they think they want, remedy wise, this
language is understood in light of the proposition that the federal government is one of limited
powers, and that expansive action by the federal judiciary is particularly to be feared.
A brief explanation of the concern in this area economically conflates the concerns of
separation of powers with those of federalism. As noted above, the federal government generally

been claimed in England by both courts of law and courts of equity. Ronald Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt
Power, 1961 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 8 (1961). Note, too, the logical disconnect that would be created if one bought into
both the conclusion that deterrence is punitive and that equity cannot punish. Whatever would become of injunctive
relief? This argument is amplified in a companion article. See Gabaldon, Fences, supra note 19.
188
See Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1987), discussed infra at note 325 .
189
LORD HENRY HOMES KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY Book I Ch. 8 (1760).
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See e.g., Harvard Law Review, The Equitable Remedial Doctrine: Past and Now, 67 HARV. L. REV. 836, 830
(1954); Michael T. Morley, The Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 252 (2018).
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is viewed as one of limited but supreme powers. 192 The constitutionally established structure
and process of its legislative arm 193 are designed to assure that those supreme powers are
exercised in deliberate fashion by decision-makers responsive to state and popular interests. 194
Thus, where potentially preemptive laws are adopted, it should be only after consideration of
local desires. The federal judiciary is in no way designed to be similarly responsive and, if
initiating some sort of lawmaking process without either constitutional direction or legislative
invitation, might pose a free-wheeling hazard to the self-determination of the states and the
freedoms of their citizenry. 195 Thus, the ability of the federal courts to engage in common lawmaking (discussed in Section IVB(2)) is regarded as quite limited, 196 and its inherent ability to
do equity is frozen in the amber of 1789.
b. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.
Admittedly, older cases such as Porter v. Warner Holding Co., discussed above, 197 do not
reflect much judicial diffidence with respect to the ability of federal courts to do equity. By
1999, the tide had distinctly turned, and Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond
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See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
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by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
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Fund, Inc., 198 reflected the law of the land. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and
joined by current Justice Thomas (among others), had this to say (some citations omitted):
The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction over “all suits . . .
in equity.” We have long held that “[t]he ‘jurisdiction’ thus conferred . . . is an authority
to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had
been devised and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of
the separation of the two countries.” “Substantially, then, the equity jurisdiction of the
federal courts is the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in
England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original
Judiciary Act.” “[T]he substantive prerequisites for obtaining an equitable remedy as well
as the general availability of injunctive relief . . . depend on traditional principles of
equity jurisdiction.” We must ask, therefore, whether the relief respondents requested
here was traditionally accorded by courts of equity. 199
The majority concluded that the District Court in that case lacked the authority to issue a
preliminary injunction preventing disposition of assets pending adjudication of a contract claim
for money damages because such a remedy was not available in England in 1789. 200 A fourJustice minority including current Justices Ginsburg and Breyer would “have defined the scope
of federal equity in relation to the principles of equity existing at the separation of the country
from England” rather than “limit[ing] federal equity jurisdiction to the specific practices and
remedies of the pre-Revolutionary Chancellor.” 201 The minority’s justification of a “dynamic
equity jurisprudence” lay in the “needs of a progressive social condition in which new primary
rights and duties are constantly arising and new kinds of wrongs are constantly committed.” 202
As it turns out, reasonable people have differed over whether disgorgement closely
resembles some specific practice of 18th century Chancery. Purists – or, perchance, those who do
not wish to see the SEC pursue disgorgement in federal courts – argue that orders to pay money
198
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amounts rather than to return illegally obtained property or its specifically identified proceeds
(what this article has referred to as “restitution”) historically were legal remedies, not equitable
matters. 203 Only in the instance of breaches of fiduciary duty was this not the rule. 204 On the
other hand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, in SEC v. Cavanagh, applied the Grupo
Mexicana test and found SEC disgorgement sufficiently similar to 18th century equitable
remedies to be up to snuff. 205 It found analogies in accounting, constructive trust, and
restitution, and invoked two 18th century English Chancery cases (as well as a few early
American cases) as precedent. 206 At least one commentator on the case has found the analogies
unconvincing and the precedents inapt, returning to the argument that “disgorgement [as opposed
to restitution] . . . is available [as an equitable remedy] only when the defendant has breached an
obligation of ‘good faith or loyalty’” 207 – in gross terms, where there has been a breach of
fiduciary duty. This is because both accounting and constructive trust were remedies
traditionally applied only in the context of such a breach. It certainly is worth noting, then, and
not just as an aside, that almost the entirety of insider trading jurisprudence is premised on
breach of fiduciary duty or some similar duty of trust and confidence. 208 One might posit that
even disgorgement naysayers could be coaxed to admit that the remedy might be available in that
context. This proposition will be further explored in Part D below. 209
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It also is worth a moment to return to Lord Kames’ 18th century treatise, cited above for
the proposition that the punitive nature of a remedy does not mean that it cannot be equitable. 210
It now is examined for the proposition that equity sometimes ordered monetary payments by
those other than fiduciaries. In fact, Lord Kames gives several examples of equity ordering
monetary payments by persons not themselves owing a fiduciary duty to the payee. 211 It is
important to note they are not presented by Lord Kames as categorical imperatives – equity at the
time was not so constrained – although a few clearly did later coalesce into hard and fast rules.
Lord Kames’ examples included third parties knowingly participating in a fiduciary’s breach, 212
parties to contracts with decedents made for third parties’ benefits, 213 and men who have
“debauched” women (presumably as a type of restitution for the taking of an intangible asset). 214
Perhaps most tellingly, as discussion in this article turns to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 215 Lord Kames describes the equitable
obligation of owners of property to make restitution to ship captains for ransom paid for goods
later lost at sea. 216 Presumably, this was equitable rather than a matter of common law recovery
on assumpsit (an implied or express promise to pay for a benefit) because the goods were
recumbent in Davy Jones’ Locker, rather than delivered to their intended recipients: thus, the
ransom of the property in no way enriched its owners. The distinction between equitable and
legal restitution is further amplified in the discussion of Great-West immediately below, 217 but
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this example reinforces the point that 18th century courts of equity did order money amounts to
be paid by those other than breaching fiduciaries. This clearly was true even if the order did not
relate to the proceeds of specific illegally obtained property. 218
c. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
Some commentators critical of the SEC disgorgement remedy do not focus much, if at
all, on analysis of the Judiciary Act. Instead, they invoke the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson. As one such commentator described it,
“Great-West articulated the Court’s most recent and authoritative teaching on whether and under
what circumstances a restitutionary remedy constitutes equitable relief, as opposed to legal relief,
in the context of a federal statute that explicitly allows the former but not the latter.” 219 This line
of argument is directed foursquare at the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley legislation authorizing the
Commission to seek, and federal courts to grant, “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or
necessary for the benefit of investors.”
In Great-West, the Court was called upon to determine whether contractually called-for
reimbursement for payments made by a third party to a beneficiary of an insurance plan was
“equitable relief” as authorized by Section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). In the view of Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ERISA’s
enforcement scheme was “carefully crafted” and “‘[e]quitable’ relief must mean something less
than all relief.’” 220 Instead, it is limited to “those categories of relief that were typically
available in equity. . . .” 221 Justice Scalia specifically discounted the need to make “antiquarian
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inquiry,” however, saying that a court rarely would be called upon to do more than consult
“standard current works” such as treatises and Restatements. 222 In reliance on those sources, he
rebuffed the argument that the remedy sought was permissible as a form of “restitution,” noting
that the term sometimes is used – in the Restatement of Restitution and elsewhere – to describe
an equitable remedy, but sometimes it refers to a legal remedy. 223 According to Justice Scalia
(although Lord Kames might have disagreed), only claims based on title or right to particular
funds or property – that is, claims based on the plaintiff’s loss – fall into the former category. 224
Claims based on “just grounds to recover money to pay for some benefit the defendant had
received from him” were based on express or implied promises and actionable under the
common law writ of assumpsit. 225 In the Court’s view, then, Great-West simply had an express
promise (a/k/a contract) claim on which a court in equity would not properly have acted. 226
It is easy, of course, to see how Great-West maps in the disgorgement context. If
disgorgement is to be justified as an equitable remedy, it must be the type of relief typically
available in equity. To the casual observer, the closest such remedy appears to be restitution.
Restitution based on a plaintiff’s loss of property was equitable, restitution based on a
defendant’s unjust gain (what this article consistently refers to as “disgorgement”) was legal. If
restitution that is not loss-of-property-based does not make it into equity’s basket, that
conclusion seems dispositive with respect to SEC disgorgement. 227
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Great-West, however, had its own footnotes, and two of them are particularly, well,
noteworthy. Footnote 2 recognizes that accounting for profits is a form of equitable restitution.
It says that “[i]f, for example, a plaintiff is [the beneficial owner and therefore] entitled to a
constructive trust on particular property held by the defendant he may also recover profits
produced by the defendant’s use of that property, even if he cannot identify a particular res
containing the profits sought to be recovered.” 228 This should refocus inquiry in the
disgorgement setting on the distinction between wrongdoers who are fiduciaries and those who
are not. 229 Most importantly, those guilty of inside trading often are misusing their beneficiaries’
confidential information and one certainly would expect, as an equitable matter, to see them
account for their profits from that misuse. 230
Footnote 4 involves a fairly lengthy discussion of back pay in the context of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 231 The statutory language at issue stated that “the court may . . .
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate.” 232 The Great-West Court, evidently not wishing to discredit an
earlier decision, 233 conceded that back pay, albeit an order of monetary damages, could be
regarded as an equitable remedy because, by statute, it had been made an “integral part” of
equitable relief and was not itself a freestanding claim for money damages. 234 Presumably, this
means that if Congress had at some point in so many words authorized the Commission to seek,
and federal courts to grant, “injunctions, with or without disgorgement, and any other equitable
228
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relief,” disgorgement could be regarded as “an integral part” of equitable relief, at least if sought
in tandem with an injunction, and at least for the purposes of the statute in question. 235 The real
point, however, is that Congress can expressly create any legal remedies it likes, so if it
adequately has manifested intent a remedy exist, it really does not matter whether it is legal or
equitable, other than for the constitutional purposes discussed in Part IVC of this article.
d. When Grupo Mexicano and When Great-West?
Before amplifying the proposition that SEC disgorgement actually is a legal remedy in at
least some circumstances, there is an interesting distinction to be addressed. This is the
contextual difference between Grupo Mexicano and Great-West. The Court in Great-West,
unlike the Court in Grupo Mexicano, did not tell its readers that the clock stopped in 1789.
Although the Court did not address the distinction in so many words, it can sensibly be
explained. 236 The year 1789 may be critical when the meaning of the Judiciary Act is at issue,
but logically it is not so when one is applying a subsequent statute. In other words, the Judiciary
Act’s empowerment of the federal courts to do equity untethered to a more specific statutory
prompt can be taken as a short-hand legislative reference to a packet of limited remedies
available in 1789 in a limited set of circumstances. The packet logically can be expanded as a
matter of legislative will, either by identifying new circumstances in which the traditional
remedies will apply or, presumably, by expanding the remedies themselves. Thus, the
ruminating court should ask whether ERISA, the Exchange Act, or some other statute has
accomplished such an expansion for purposes of that statute. References to equitable authority
in this context need not be – and should not be – tied specifically to practices in 1789, but instead
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should be assessed in terms of the general type of thing courts of equity traditionally have done,
which, according to Justice Scalia, can be ascertained by reference to “standard current sources”
rather than “antiquarian inquiry.” 237 This dovetails rather beautifully with a textualist’s
disposition to take “meaning . . . from the ring the words would have had to a skilled user of
words at the time, thinking about the same problem,” 238 and it means that, when one is deriving
the meaning of modern statutes it is more appropriate to rely on Professor Dan Dobbs 239 than on
Lord Kames. Moreover, as Great-West’s footnote 4 suggests, with sufficient clarity a modern
Congress can even manage to expand the judicial toolkit signaled by the word “equitable” by
specifying additional acceptable types of relief. 240
d. Other Precedents
i. Expansive Views on disgorgement: Porter and Kansas
Neither Grupo Mexicano nor Great-West involved disgorgement. Both manifested
relatively much more interest in equitable purity than some of the Court’s other precedents that
actually are more apt. One of these is the Porter case discussed above, which examined the
federal courts’ ability to order restitution under the Emergency Price Control Act. 241 One might
think that Porter’s enthusiastically expansive view of the power to do equity could not survive
the later decisions, but this does not seem to be the case. It has been cited as good authority not
only in Kokesh (for the proposition that courts may order restitution) but in the 2015 case of
Kansas v. Nebraska, discussed below, in which the Court ordered outright disgorgement rather
237
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Easterbrook, supra note 152, at 61.
239
See, e.g., 534 U.S. at 211, 212, 213, and 217 (citing DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES (1993) and other modern
sources).
240
This will simply mean the “equitable” remedy is available, even though it likely to be regarded as “legal” for
right to jury purposes as described infra at notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
241
See also Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134 (1850) (restitution coupled with injunction ordered as a matter of
equity in absence of any fiduciary relationship); James Boyce’s Executors v. Grundy, 28 U.S. 210, 3 Pet. 210
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than restitution. 242 As Professor Nagy has observed, it may very well be the case that the PorterKansas line can be distinguished as involving the interests of the public, whereas Grupo
Mexicano and Great-West involved interests that were purely private. 243
Kansas v. Nebraska portrays a Supreme Court untethered by statute and reliant only on
its constitutional original jurisdiction over inter-state disputes. 244 The case involved Nebraska’s
deliberate violation of a Congressionally approved water compact with Kansas; at issue was the
permissibility of ordering disgorgement of profits clearly in excess of Kansas’s losses (because
water was more valuable in Nebraska). The Court noted that its jurisdiction in the matter was
“basically equitable” and that “[i]n this singular sphere, ‘the court may regulate and mould the
process it uses in such a manner as in its judgment will best promote the purposes of justice.’” 245
It cited Porter for the proposition that “[w]hen federal law is at issue and ‘the public interest is
involved,’ a federal court's ‘equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible
character than when only a private controversy is at stake.’” 246 The Court concluded that it “may
order disgorgement of gains, if needed to stabilize a compact and deter future breaches, when a
State has demonstrated reckless disregard of another, more vulnerable State's rights . . ..” 247 The
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment figured prominently in the analysis,
with the Court making use of Section 39, a provision commending disgorgement of ill-gotten
profit as a remedy for deliberate breaches of contract. 248
Interestingly, there was no mention whatsoever of the state of equity in 1789, or of the
fact that breaches of contract were legal matters at the time of Our Founders. This is appropriate
242
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given that its source of authority is not the Judiciary Act and its hidebound distinctions, but
rather its Article III authority over all controversies between states. In fact, although the Court
described itself as acting in equity, it should not matter whether it was acting equitably or
making common law, as it (1) was resolving a matter in which the ability of federal courts to
make common law as well as to do equity is recognized 249 and (2) was addressing the rights and
obligations of entities that have no rights under the Seventh Amendment (which, as discussed in
Part IVC of this article, is the primary continuing significance of the equitable/legal
distinction). 250 The case nonetheless is relevant insofar as it clearly does characterize
disgorgement as an equitable remedy and one that is specifically approved where public interests
are involved. This latter observation allows one to conclude that there is a clear and continuing
tonal difference between the Court’s public interest equitable remedy cases and its private
interest equitable remedy cases – including Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., discussed below. 251
Before turning to Mertens, however, the Kansas minority opinions (each concurring in
part and dissenting in part) deserve a few honorable mentions. First, Chief Justice Roberts
separately wrote to recognize the Court’s authority to order disgorgement, but not when it ran
contrary to the states’ agreed upon accounting procedures. 252 Second, Justice Scalia separately
observed that the Restatement provision relied upon by the majority clearly was not actually an
accurate reflection of the state of the law, but was more along the lines of an academic
suggestion. 253 Finally, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito and Scalia and in part by Chief
Justice Roberts, accepted the proposition that public interest would justify expansive use of
249
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federal equitable power when enforcement of a federal scheme is an issue, but felt that the
converse should be true when all that is at stake is a dispute between two states. 254 The
composite of majority and minority opinions does suggest that all of the Justices participating in
Kansas could find their own precedent for the approval of disgorgement when a federal interest
(presumably including the one in enforcing the federal securities laws) is at stake.
ii. A Clearly Restrictive View: Mertens
Moving once again back in time and swinging back in the direction of private interests
and equitable purity is the case of Mertens v. Hewitt Associates. 255 This is another ERISA case,
and one on which Great-West heavily relied. It recognized the traditional ability of courts of
equity to grant legal remedies in some circumstances. These included a third party’s knowing
participation in a fiduciary breach (described, of course, by Lord Kames 256). It concluded,
however, that granting a modern court the power to declare equitable relief did not necessarily
confer the ability to declare all those same legal remedies, even given the traditional enabling
circumstances. Consider the following:
At common law, however, there were many situations— not limited to those involving
enforcement of a trust—in which an equity court could “establish purely legal rights and
grant legal remedies which would otherwise be beyond the scope of its authority.” The
term “equitable relief” can assuredly mean, as petitioners and the Solicitor General would
have it, whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at
issue. But . . . “equitable relief” can also refer to those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages). As memories of the divided bench, and familiarity with its
technical refinements, recede further into the past, the former meaning becomes, perhaps,
increasingly unlikely; but it remains a question of interpretation in each case which
meaning is intended.
In the context of the present statute, we think there can be no doubt. Since all relief
available for breach of trust could be obtained from a court of equity, limiting the sort of
254
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relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3) to “equitable relief” in the sense of “whatever relief a
common-law court of equity could provide in such a case” would limit the relief not at
all. (Emphasis added.) 257
Given the grant of legal remedies for breach of some provisions of ERISA and only equitable
remedies for others (including knowing participation in fiduciary breach), the Court elected the
narrower of the meanings it discussed.
Of particular importance in thinking about SEC disgorgement is Merten’s observation
with respect to the significance of the statutory scheme. The quotation above does say that
which meaning of “equitable relief” is intended is “a question of interpretation in each case” –
which evidently means the case of each statute invoking the term, since discussion at that point is
focused exclusively on the statute rather than its application to the facts. With respect to ERISA,
the Court commented that the “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides
‘strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to
incorporate expressly.’” 258 By contrast, it is fair to say that the federal securities enforcement
scheme has not been all that carefully crafted. Rather, it more-or-less has metastasized in
response to eruptions of financial scandals and crises, giving strong – perhaps indisputable –
evidence that Congress indeed simply “forgot” to authorize disgorgement expressly.
iii. Antitrust and Other Cases
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 259 grants federal district courts the “jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations” of the Act and makes it the duty of U.S. Attorneys to “institute
proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.” 260 According to Professor Einer
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102, at 1000.
258
Id. at 254 (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985)).
259
15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1890).
260
Id. §4.

[DRAFT] | 105 Cornell L. Rev. __ (2020)

Elhauge, “there is surprisingly little doubt that equitable antitrust remedies include requiring
violators to disgorge any illegally obtained profits.” 261 In United States v. Paramount Pictures
the Court noted that, without disgorgement,
there would be reward from the conspiracy through retention of its fruits. Hence the
problem of the District Court does not end with enjoining continuance of the unlawful
restraints nor with dissolving the combination which launched the conspiracy. Its
function includes undoing what the conspiracy achieved . . . [T]he requirement that the
defendants restore what they unlawfully obtained is no more punishment than the familiar
remedy of restitution. 262
Admittedly, Paramount was of the same generation as Porter – a sort of yippee-ki-yay high
water mark with respect to judicial authority. Still, it was followed by other Supreme Court
cases Professor Elhauge describes as “equally emphatic.” 263 Of a piece, a number of lower court
cases interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act have, in applying a statute permitting only
equitable remedies, freely ordered disgorgement. 264 Interestingly, at the time of his article,
Professor Elhauge described disgorgement in the antitrust context as a remedy that was “seldom
used.” 265 His arguments about why this is the case center around the possible unfairness to the
innocent shareholders of a corporation made subject to disgorgement – a scenario that also can
arise in some SEC disgorgement contexts. In any event, it appears that the invocation of
disgorgement in antitrust litigation subsequently has become much more prevalent. 266
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There are several other areas in which various federal agency have sought and received
disgorgement orders as part of their enforcement authority. 267 Thus, for instance, the EPA has
obtained disgorgement of profits obtained in violation of the Toxic Substances Control Act, a
statute limiting the agency to equitable remedies, 268 and the Department of Justice has obtained it
under RICO. 269 These examples will not be further explored but are raised as an indication of the
possible breadth of application of Kokesh and its effect on administrative activities beyond those
of the SEC. 270
e. Summation and Transition
This article takes the position that what “equitable” means in modern statutes should be
assessed by modern standards. The true believers in 1789 nonetheless might take the position
that the judicial ability to do equity must be narrowly construed to confer only the equitable
powers known to the founders even when Congress specifically confers an expansion. 271 The
punchline of this Part IVA, however, is that argument about whether disgorgement is or is not
equitable simply may be unnecessary, given what seems to be the accepted wisdom that if the
SEC or other governmental authority straightforwardly were empowered by Congress to seek
disgorgement as a legal remedy, all would be clear sailing. Section IVB2 turns to the possibility
that this is exactly what has occurred, concluding that where SEC disgorgement is not equitable
267
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it nonetheless exists as a legal remedy. The ultimate importance of the distinction once it is
determined that the remedy exists is the subject of Section IVC.
2. Law and Disgorgement
Mr. Ryan, alluded to above, opposed at length the existence of SEC disgorgement as a
function of the Commission’s authority to seek, and the federal courts’ authority to do, equity. 272
He was rather pithier with respect to disgorgement as a legal matter:
[W]henever disgorgement is legal rather than equitable, the SEC has no lawful power to
seek it in federal court proceedings, and the courts have no lawful power to award it.
Being purely a creature of statute, the SEC can lawfully seek in court only those remedies
Congress has authorized it to seek, and disgorgement at law is not among those remedies.
Likewise, being courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts can lawfully impose only
those remedies at law that Congress has authorized in the relevant statutes. . . . 273
The basic beef, then, is that Congress hasn’t said it so the courts can’t do it, which leads us to an
exegesis of hostility to judicial activism, briefly previewed above. 274 It presumably is precisely
this hostility that would lead a court to eschew the “beyond peradventure” approach urged earlier
in this article. 275
a. The Nature of Federal Common Law
No constitutional or statutory provision generally grants to the federal courts the power to
make common law. 276 Article III of the Constitution defines the jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary by reference to certain listed subjects. These subjects include “all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority,” “Controversies to which the United States shall be a
party,” “all Cases in Law and Equity between Citizens of different States,” “Controversies
272
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between two or more States,” “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,” and “Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.” 277 Federal courts clearly recognize
distinctions in the precise character of their lawmaking abilities even as among these enumerated
categories; 278 as noted above, grants of jurisdiction are said not necessarily to constitute enabling
authority. 279 In recognized “enclaves” such as admiralty, 280 interstate disputes, 281 and
international relations, 282 federal common law clearly can exist without specific grounding in
federal statutes. 283 These are, not coincidentally, spheres in which courts regard state regulation
as illicit. 284 By contrast, in the case of general federal question jurisdiction, Article III is
regarded as not self-executing and thus requiring legislative invocation – in other words, a
trigger such as the Judiciary Act, ERISA, or the federal securities laws. 285 Thus, in areas
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including the regulation of securities, the Supreme Court has indicated diffidence about federal,
judge-made law, 286 fueling the claim that “extra-enclave” federal common law should be
fashioned only in response to legislative invitation. 287 As suggested above in the context of
federal equity jurisprudence, the justifications for this claim are at least two-fold, contemplating
concern both with separation of powers and with federalism. 288 Whether either of these primary
concerns rises to the level of constitutional compulsion is not clear. 289 At their least compelling,
they nonetheless are serious questions of policy, the answers to which may be influenced by
beliefs as to the goals of the Founders and the importance of attaining those goals. 290
Although there was a time at which at least one scholar contended that “the concerns of
separation and federalism are adequately served by a test requiring federal courts to point to the
the outer boundary of what Congress may do, but Congress is regarded as having the power to do less – i.e., to vest
less than the whole of Article III’s “arising under” jurisdiction. (Citing various sources and then arguing to
contrary.))
286
One clear example is provided by Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 634-46 (1981) (holding
that because unique federal interests are not at stake, and because Congress did not delegate the power, federal
courts are unable to fashion a common law of contribution under federal statute). For discussion and criticism of the
Court's diffidence, see, e.g., Field, supra note 276, at 889-90 n.28, 892 n.39, 911- 12 n.140, 940 n.244; Steven D.
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Constitution or some congressional enactment as ‘background,’” 291 most current commentators
probably would doubt that this is just how the courts now see it themselves. Another approach,
advanced decades ago and perhaps still conveying a practical composite of the type of things one
sees many, if not most, federal judges actually doing, is an approach ceding to the federal
judiciary only the power to make common law in the traditional enclaves and the power to
engage in three more circumscribed activities. 292 The first activity comprehends judicial
application of specific statutory language to a set of facts (which may call for what some refer to
as traditional “interpretation” and/or “construction” and what textualists would call “deriving
statutory meaning”). The second is the exercise of authority delegated by Congress. The third is
“where not to decide the issue is effectively to decide,” or where issues “not covered by
[statutory] text must be resolved before the statute can be applied to matters clearly within its
realm.” 293 This “necessity” test would apply where, for instance, an express private right of
action provided by statute exists without a stated statute of limitations.
There are, of course, more conservative tests, including one referred to as the “plain
language” approach 294 – and if one simply chose to refer to it as “textualist,” one probably could
be excused. The plain language test of course permits application of statutes to facts, albeit
without reference to legislative history. It also requires that delegation of authority to the
judiciary be specific, but does permit it. It eschews, however, the “where not to decide is to
decide” or “necessity” allée. The plain language test as thus described almost certainly is
normative rather than descriptive of most actual judicial outcomes – but of course does describe
the approach of judges who most fervently embrace textualism.
291
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b. Disgorgement as a Matter of Federal Common Law
How, then, would SEC disgorgement fare under these various approaches? Almost
certainly it could exist in the eyes of any commentator looking for no more than “background.”
After all, those multifarious references to disgorgement sprinkled throughout federal securities
legislation seem emphatically to be a background against which disgorgement can be discerned.
In fact, the background is so pronounced as to suggest the metaphor of an Invisible Man
identifiable by his clothing, hat and bandages. It clearly does exist, even though you could not
see it but for the statutory company it keeps.
Neither does disgorgement fare too badly under the application/delegation/necessity
approach. Reserving the “application of the statute” prong for analysis below in the context of
the discussion of the plain language test, which shares it, 295 either delegation or necessity could
justify recognition of SEC disgorgement. The tripartite approach is not particularly demanding
of evidence of delegation – although criticism of utterly standardless delegation will be further
examined below. 296 Thus, one might point to Exchange Act Section 21(e), the legislative grant
of authority to issue writs of mandamus, injunctions, and orders, which has existed since 1975, 297
as delegating to the judiciary the ability to devise such remedies as they regard appropriate to
bring about compliance with the ’34 Act. That delegation is nicely unconstrained by the statutory
company kept by the term “orders” since, as noted above, writs of mandamus were legal
matters, 298 while injunctions are equitable. As post-1789 innovations, however, it seems that
many, if not most, such “orders” necessarily would be legal.
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Alternatively, one could argue that it is necessary to decide whether disgorgement exists
before one can employ the various parts of the federal scheme describing how the process is to
work. If this were the case, the necessity question presumably would be posed as whether the
other parts of the scheme were enacted simply to erect a structure to be employed at such point in
the future as Congress decided to recognize disgorgement specifically (not really very likely) or
whether they channel an existing remedy (more practically plausible).
The plain language approach is more demanding of evidence of delegation than the
tripartite approach, and also may criticize some delegations as too broad. As noted, the question
of breadth of, or standards for, delegation is separately examined below. 299 At this point,
however, full body contact with the “application of the statute” characterization comes into play.
Reiterating that “plain language” and “textualism” approaches essentially conflate, let the readers
return to the proposition that textualists, in applying statutes, simply look for their “meaning . . .
from the ring the words would have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about the
same problem.” (Emphasis added.) 300 At the time of Sarbanes-Oxley’s addition to the Exchange
Act of the ability to grant all “equitable” remedies, it is clear that skilled users referring to
“equitable” remedies in the context of federal securities laws most definitely understood it to
include disgorgement. Justice Scalia’s analysis in Great West essentially would permit the
“skilled users” test to be determined by reference to “standard current sources,” rather than
“antiquarian inquiry,” which in 2002 should mean that Professor Louis Loss’s treatise on
securities regulation, relied upon two decades earlier by the Supreme Court in recognizing an
implied private right under Rule 10b-5, would be at least as relevant as Professor Dan Dobbs’
treatise on remedies. In 2002, Professor Loss’s then current treatise devoted several pages to the
299
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subject of disgorgement, tracing it back to its origin in Texas Gul Sulphur and describing its
subsequent uses. 301
c. A Sidebar on Delegation
Before undertaking the fairly light lifting necessary to articulate the effects of the
legal/equitable distinction, a few words are merited on the question of standards of delegation,
for, as noted, even textualists will permit delegation in some circumstances. Delegation issues
most frequently present themselves in terms of “non-delegation theory.” Non-delegation theory
is based on the “Vesting Clause” of the Constitution, 302 which (surprise!) vests all legislative
powers in Congress, and which generally is regarded as a requirement that Congress provide any
delegee with an “intelligible principle” for exercising the delegated authority. 303 One might
expect practitioners of textualism to be rather more demanding with respect to such principles,
and it appears that they are. 304
Although some commentators do not believe non-delegation theory should extend to the
judiciary, 305 others argue that Supreme Court precedent has long recognized that it “applies to
any delegate.” (Emphasis in the original.)

306

Still, according to Professor Alexander Volokh,

“when we talk about the proper scope of federal common law . . . we’re also talking about the
permissible scope of standardless congressional delegations to federal courts.” 307 In his view, the
Court also has recognized, for at least eighty years, “that the requirement of an intelligible
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principle is relaxed – or dropped entirely – when the delegate already has some inherent power
over the subject matter.” 308 He notes that some commentators, including himself, believe the
intelligible principle requirement can be dispensed with when the delegee already has at least
some inherent power over the subject matter. 309 In the case of federal courts, this would extend at
least to “procedural rulemaking, remedies, or common lawmaking associated with statutes.”
(Emphasis added.) 310 In this view, a delegation of the ability to “order” whatever remedy a
federal court chose in order to achieve compliance with federal securities laws could withstand
scrutiny. As Professor Volokh notes, Justice Scalia himself recognized that statutory
interpretation and procedural rulemaking do not “violate the non-delegation doctrine because
they’re ‘ancillary’ to courts’ exercise of judicial power.” 311 In light of his opinion in Grupo
Mexicano it would be inapposite to extend Justice Scalia’s view to the power to decree equitable
remedies for constitutional purposes, 312 but perhaps not so problematic in the case of delegated
authority to shape remedies that are legal for constitutional purposes.
C. The Difference Between Legal and Equitable Remedies – Or Which is Which, and
Why?
So what, exactly, is the buzz? If the question is whether a judge does or does not have
authority to order a particular remedy under a particular statute referring only to equitable
remedies, concern with the equitable/legal distinction is (as exhaustively detailed above)
warranted. If, on the other hand, it is clear that the remedy in question is authorized, one way or
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another, why would anyone still care about the distinction between law and equity, given that the
two were merged in 1938? 313
For years, it was thought that the importance of the distinction inhered in dragging along
a presumed package of add-ons in the event an action is one or another. An earlier section of this
article introduced a litany of disgorgement-related issues lower courts have been required to
resolve. Many of them tended to be answered simply by characterizing disgorgement as
equitable rather than legal, and then presuming that equitable actions are not punitive. 314 These
included whether disgorgement was punishment for double jeopardy purposes, whether it was
discharged in bankruptcy, whether it was tax deductible, and whether it was enforceable by
contempt sanctions. For most of its history, courts also took its equitable status to preclude
application of a statute of limitations. As the Supreme Court demonstrated in Kokesh, however,
most of these matters actually should be resolved without bogging down on, or making
assumptions about, equitable status. Thus, in Kokesh the matter properly before – and properly
recognized by – the Court was whether disgorgement was a forfeiture or a penalty under Section
2462, not whether it was equitable. Similarly, for purposes of tax deductibility, bankruptcy, and
insurability, the question generally should turn on the demands of public policy, not on whether
the remedy is equitable. The answer to the double jeopardy issue should be reckoned by whether
disgorgement is a form of punishment, not by whether it is equitable. 315 With respect to the
question of enforcement by orders of contempt, the equitable v. legal distinction may still have
salience, so there the question may (outside the pages of this article) persist. 316
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See https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-merge-equity-and-common-law.
See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
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See Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 110 (1997) (reinstating a double jeopardy meaning limited to multiple criminal
prosecutions).
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Courts have tended to accept that SEC disgorgement is essentially equitable, rather than the equivalent of a debt,
and therefore is enforceable by contempt. See, e.g., SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1993); SEC v.
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As it turns out, though, after the clutter is discarded the most significant consequence of
the equitable/legal distinction is whether there is a right to trial by jury – recognized in the case
of a legal remedy, but not in the case of an equitable one. 317 In the view of Professor Doug
Rendleman (shared by the author of this article),
As the profession learns that the legal-equitable distinction is not functional and no
longer useful except for analyzing the constitutional right to a civil jury, it may replace
the more general terms equitable jurisdiction and equitable remedy with the name of the
particular remedy - injunction or specific performance. Except for the jury trial right,
postmerger policymakers in legislatures and courts might omit the megaclassifications,
legal and equitable, and decide questions like scope of review based on policies discrete
to each subject. Characterization as legal or equitable, if necessary for one purpose, need
not carry over to others. 318
In some cases, even the jury trial distinction may not be a practical one. For instance, the SEC
frequently seeks some remedy clearly giving right to a jury trial at the same time it seeks
disgorgement. 319 As a matter of fact, it was a jury of Mr. Kokesh’s (non-polo playing?) peers
who convicted him of fraud under three different securities laws. 320 The distinction nonetheless
is worth unpacking.
The Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury in “suits at common law.” 321
As Justice Story stated in 1830,
The phrase ‘common law,’ found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and
admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence. . . . By common law, [the Framers of the
Amendment] meant . . . not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its
old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized,
and equitable remedies were administered . . . . In a just sense, the amendment then may
Goldfarb, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85628 at *10-17 (N.D. Cal. 2012). But see SEC v. New Futures Trading Int’l Corp.,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55557 at *5-6 (D.N.H. 2012) (enforcement through contempt not appropriate).
317
See infra notes 321-26 and accompanying text.
318
Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1642, 1648 (1992); see also Dennis J.
Wiley, Enforcing Recoupment Provisions After Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson: A
Suggested Method of Analysis for Reviewing Courts, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1195, 1203 (2006) (noting that
“relief may be categorized as equitable for one purpose and legal for another purpose”).
319
Actions for civil monetary penalties, for example, clearly confer a jury right.
320
See Kokesh, 137 S.Ct. at 1641.
321
U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
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well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights. 322
Curtis v. Loether is a more recent landmark addressing the right to jury trial in the context of a
discrimination claim brought under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”
Although the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed
in 1791, it has long been settled that the right extends beyond the common-law forms of
action recognized at that time. 323
Thus, the protections of the Seventh Amendment extend to all claims that were not, at the time of
the founders, equitable or maritime in nature. As a later case read Curtis, “[t]his analysis applies
not only to common-law forms of action, but also to causes of action created by congressional
enactment.” 324
That later case, Tull v. United States, augmented the analysis in Curtis, at least for
purposes of litigation about disgorgement. Tull involved the government’s claim that a suit for
civil penalties under the Clean Water Act essentially was “an action for disgorgement of
improper profits, traditionally considered an equitable remedy.” The remedy that had been
ordered in that case was a fine determined by multiplying the number of lots sold in violation of
the Act by the profit earned per lot. The Court reacted as follows:
An action for disgorgement of improper profits is. . . a poor analogy. Such an action is a
remedy only for restitution – a more limited form of penalty than a civil fine. Restitution
is limited to “restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully
322

Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446-447 (1830).
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). The viability of the remedy sought was not an issue in Curtis – the
Court did not question Congress’s ability to create it or the federal courts’ authority to decree it – but it came with
the right to jury trial because the type of remedy sought (compensatory and punitive damages) would not have been
understood by the founders as equitable. Interestingly, in coming to its conclusion the Court went to pains to
distinguish both the restitution recognized as equitable in Porter (see supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text) and
(without expressing an opinion thereon) the lower courts’ willingness to order, as an equitable matter, reinstatement
and backpay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97. These cases were not right
to jury cases, but rather addressed the question of judicial authority to order particular remedies, so the Court in
Curtis may have unnecessarily conflated constitutional and statutory meaning issues when it mentioned them at all.
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481 U.S. 412, 414 (1987) quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193.
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belongs to the purchaser or tenant.” . . . [Section] 1319(d)'s concerns are by no means
limited to restoration of the status quo. 325
Given the SEC’s bent for acknowledging that restitution is no more than a subsidiary purpose of
its disgorgement remedy, Tull permits an argument that, as currently managed, at least some
disgorgement actions require jury trials.
For Seventh Amendment purposes, there currently is a clear, two-step test for
determining what is equitable. According to Teamsters v. Terry,
To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, we examine both the
nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought. “First, we compare the statutory
action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the
courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether
it is legal or equitable in nature.” The second inquiry is the more important in our
analysis. 326
The Court clearly did not regard itself as bound by the Terry approach in either Grupo Mexicano
or Great-West (although, in the latter, the case was discussed in a footnote and distinguished by
the majority), 327 presumably because in those cases it simply was focusing on the meaning of
statutes (the Judiciary Act and ERISA, respectively) and was indifferent to the jury trial issue. In
a case raising both statutory meaning and jury trial questions it well might wind up recognizing
that what was denominated “equitable” by statute sometimes really is “at law” for purposes of
the Seventh Amendment.
Another and perhaps more helpful way to frame this argument is to say that statutes
authorizing the seeking and granting of remedies properly should be understood as signaling the
availability and shape of those remedies, not as actually determining whether they are equitable
or legal in nature. This is because the significance of the difference inheres in their
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Id. at 424 (quoting Porter, 328 U. S. at 402).
494 U.S. 558 (1990) (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-18 and citing Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S.
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constitutional distinctions, which should be beyond the ability of Congress to affect. Thus, a
declaration along the lines that the federal courts have the ability to order “disgorgement and
other equitable relief” or “all equitable relief, including disgorgement” presumably would mean
that disgorgement could be ordered, even though it might or might not constitute a remedy
qualifying as equitable for constitutional purposes. 328
D. Recapitulation and Further Analysis
Let us note once again the following points, made in a slightly different order. First,
Congress could expressly permit the SEC to pursue disgorgement as a legal matter. Second, it
would not be too far-fetched for a court to heave a sigh and take the “beyond peradventure”
approach, acknowledging that Congress has as good as done so. Third, since Congress in 2002
specifically authorized the Commission to seek all equitable relief, Grupo Mexicano and the
Judiciary Act technically should be irrelevant – instead, it should be relevant to determine what
skilled users in 2002 thought “equitable relief” to mean in the context of securities regulation,
particularly in light of the chain of statutory breadcrumbs and cascade of court cases
acknowledging existence of the remedy. 329 Fourth, although Great-West called for “equitable
relief” to mean less than “all relief,” the “skilled users at the time” approach would not extend to
all relief even if it did pick up disgorgement; moreover, the federal securities laws lack the
328

In other words, if Congress had specified a disgorgement remedy without adverting to equity, it would simply go
to the federal courts to decide its status for constitutional purposes. If it had expressly but mistakenly said
“disgorgement and other equitable remedies” or “disgorgement as part of a court’s equity power” it seems logical to
recognize the remedy but again refer the matter of constitutional compliance to the federal courts. Although not
completely apt, there is Supreme Court precedent addressing the transfer from equitable to legal in the context of
mistaken filing of claims. In White v. Sparkill, a pre-merger case, the Court noted that the then applicable legal and
equitable procedural rules “contemplate[d] that where what is really an action at law is erroneously begun as a suit
in equity, the same may be transferred to the law side of the court and after appropriate amendments may be
prosecuted to a judgment as if originally begun on the law side.” 280 U.S. 500, 500 (1930).
On the other hand, perhaps one might be concerned that Congress wanted disgorgement to exist only if it could
be administered without resort to a jury trial. Textualists, however, would not be interested in what Congress
wanted, only in what it said to skilled users at the time.
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An argument might be made that Congress generally should be deemed to intend to use the word “equitable”
consistently throughout the centuries but that would not seem to be be consistent with the “skilled users at the time”
approach described by Easterbrook, supra note 152.
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carefully crafted enforcement scheme Mertens and Great-West discovered in ERISA. Fifth, even
if Congress denominated a remedy as equitable, that could not make it equitable for
constitutional purposes; it will be equitable for constitutional purposes only if it is akin to a
remedy available in English Chancery at the time of the founding. Sixth, whether a remedy is
equitable for constitutional purposes primarily determines the existence of the Seventh
Amendment right to trial (although assumptions about what equity means – i.e., necessarily nonpunitive in nature – have led to some confusion in the precedents).
Let us return, then, to what remedies were equitable at the time of the founders, a
question as to which Great West is instructive. Recall that outside the context of fiduciary
breach, recoveries based on the defendant’s gain were matters of common law assumpsit
whereas actions based on the plaintiff’s loss were matters of equitable relief. This seems to
delineate areas in which SEC disgorgement most clearly should survive, both as a matter of
statutory meaning and for Seventh Amendment purposes. Most obviously, in those instances in
which the Commission seeks restitution for victims – which in some cases it does – the remedy
might survive as equitable. 330
Almost as obviously, recall both that there are a number of securities violations that do
involve fiduciary breach, and that equity did indeed move aggressively to require constructive
trusts and accountings to prevent fiduciaries from benefitting from misuse (including any use
that simply was unauthorized) of a beneficiary’s property, including information. In this vein, let
us recognize that Mr. Kokesh himself would have some accounting to do – he owned and
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Moreover, to the extent that the remedy is based on making victims whole, it seems clear that it would be entirely
appropriate – and traditional – to preclude deduction of the defendant’s expenses in calculating the appropriate
amount to be disgorged.
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controlled the general partners that embezzled limited partnership funds which was (you guessed
it) a fiduciary breach (and a glaringly large one at that). 331
More broadly, and as mentioned above, almost all insider trading cases involve breach of
fiduciary duty. There are five main theories pursuant to which liability for inside trading is
imposed. 332 Traditional insiders (like those in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur) owe a duty not to use
corporate information for their own purposes. 333 Temporary insiders – like lawyers – who are
hired as agents owe the same. 334 Those liable under the “misappropriation” theory of insider
trading are those who have used information taken in breach of a fiduciary “or similar duty of
trust and confidence” 335 so perhaps this is an area where there might be a bit of slicing and
dicing. 336 The liability of a tippee derives from fiduciary breach known to the tippee and has
been analogized to a trade by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds. 337 This seems to be
exactly the kind of liability that would have whetted the 18th century equitable appetite. On the
other hand, liability under Rule 14e-3 for trading on material nonpublic information about tender
offers turns simply on the source of the information (the target or would be acquirer) rather than
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Perhaps no article on a business subject involving fiduciary duty can truly be complete without quoting Meinhard
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on the existence of fiduciary relationships, and presumably would be excluded from the realm of
traditional remedy. 338
Another area in which it is clear that equity would act in the 18th century is with respect
to ancillary legal relief. As noted above, in Texas Gulf Sulphur and since, the Commission often
has sought disgorgement in the absence of injunctive relief. In those instances in which a request
for injunctive relief is legitimately sought, with disgorgement truly appurtenant, a straight-faced
argument does exist for recognition of the subsidiary remedy as historically equitable.
At the (100%) risk of extending an already long explication, a few words are in order on
the subject of the recipient of disgorged funds, when it is not the U.S. Treasury. In some inside
trading cases, as in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the recipient is the issuer of the traded securities. This is,
of course, entirely appropriate as a matter of traditional equity, as the issuer generally is the
wronged beneficiary owed an accounting. In others, it may be injured trading partners
compensated for their losses, 339 in which case equitable restitution comes into play. In cases not
involving inside traders but, say, misrepresentations by an issuer when buying or selling its own
securities, restitution of victim’s losses also would be a matter of traditional equity but could
work injury to the issuer’s innocent shareholders. This is one of the recurring problems when
dealing with the punishment of entities. 340 It certainly is a matter a court might take into account
in shaping an order, but is beyond the scope of this article.
V. Conclusions
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The established majority construction of the Judiciary Act essentially suggests that most
progress in terms of response to modern conditions and needs must come in the form of “legal,”
rather than “equitable” developments. 341 This would seem to include the creation of new
remedies and, to the limited extent mandated by Teamsters v. Terry, the identification of new
triggers for the application of old ones. The concern thus manifest with constraining judicial
activism may be sensible – or at any rate understandable – when what one is contemplating is
preservation of what is perceived as a vital right to trial by jury. In other words, if either a new
cause of action or a new remedy comes down the pike, perhaps it is best – or at any rate simplest
– always to say that it is legal rather than equitable for Seventh Amendment purposes
Whether that logic needs to dictate the existence of remedies in the first place is an
entirely different question. One of the central claims of this article is that, in the context of
remedies, it would be wrongheaded to rely on historic practices of equity as conclusive proof of
modern statutory meaning in the presence of strongly conflicting evidence. Even without
reference to the type of legislative history Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch eschew, it is
perfectly clear from the statutory structure of the Exchange Act that Congress thinks – assuming
such a thing as Congressional thought – that the SEC disgorgement remedy exists. It is possible,
of course, that if a hypertextualist majority of the Court were formed, it might choose the
approach of taunting Congress to force it to express itself more clearly. If that were to happen,
the issue essentially would be slammed back to the legislature to see if Wall Street would get a
win. Almost certainly, the United States has not seen its last financial crisis and it is highly
likely that a disgorgement remedy would be reinstated the next time our legislators feel called
upon to pound their chests in outrage at financial fraud.
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It does seem that – if Congress thinks – it thought disgorgement was equitable when it
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; after all, that is what everyone thought. No one, however, seems
to have been thinking all that hard about what that meant, which essentially distills to the lack of
a right to trial by jury. This should not be a matter that Congress can affect one way or another.
Nonetheless, given the acknowledged post-Sarbanes-Oxley statutory authority of the federal
courts to apply any equitable remedy in order to enforce the Exchange Act, it is still possible that
hypertextualists could permit the disgorgement remedy to exist without any further expression of
Congressional intent to the extent it is historically equitable. This article takes the position that
whenever liability is premised on a breach of fiduciary duty, traditional equity would
unflinchingly strip the defalcating fiduciary of profit, and do so without reference to victim loss.
Thus, even the most conservative Justices should be willing to countenance the disgorgement
remedy in at least that context.
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